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SHOULD RACIALLY BIASED HATE 
SPEECH BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY 






In popular memory and most published accounts, The 
First Amendment of the US Constitution promises that, among 
other things, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”1 At face value, the mean-
ing of the First Amendment appears self-evident: the US Gov-
ernment cannot pass any law that in any way restricts what 
people can say or publish in the United States. But this inter-
pretation, and support for complete freedom of speech, be-
comes more difficult when one considers the wide variety of 
shocking, offensive, cruel and appalling things people can 
come up with to say to and about each other. Interestingly, 
early in United States history the First Amendment was not 
seen by the government as the binding agreement to refrain 
from restricting all speech that it is viewed as today; in fact, 
within just a few years of the First Amendment becoming part 
of the Constitution, there were successful (albeit, unpopular 
and quickly overturned) attempts to criminalize certain unfa-
vorable speech directed at the government. Anthony Lewis 
                                               
1 Note: For the purposes of this essay, speech includes both direct 
and symbolic speech–so, not only spoken and written words, but 
also actions taken in order to communicate a message. This follows 
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notes that, although this early speech law never went to the 
Supreme Court, “if it had been, the Court would almost cer-
tainly have upheld the law.”2 Today, the interpretation of the 
First Amendment accepted by the United States Supreme 
Court has shifted closer to the face-value reading of the First 
Amendment, and both state governments and the federal gov-
ernment are held to high standards of speech protection. Cur-
rently, restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny tests, 
meaning that those defending the law must demonstrate both 
that the speech issue could not be handled some other way and 
that the problem is pressing enough to warrant legal re-
striction.3 This is a test that is extremely difficult to pass, and 
most restrictions targeted at speech fail to pass this test, result-
ing in a legal culture in which legislators rarely attempt to 
make restrictions on speech and in which people are free to 
say more or less whatever they want to (and any brief survey 
of social media will reveal that many are quite happy to take 
full advantage of this freedom).  
In this paper, I will discuss two Supreme Court cases 
concerning legislation with which state and local governments 
attempted, and ultimately failed, to punish a specific category 
of speech: racially biased hate speech. My goal is to demon-
strate that, although current United States Supreme Court doc-
trine holds that laws specifically targeting racially biased hate 
speech are unconstitutional, the nature of racially biased hate 
speech is such that it should be a legitimate exception to the 
rule that law cannot proscribe the expression of certain ideas.  
In the first section of this paper, I will overview the 
court cases, providing the arguments the Court gave for each 
                                               
2 Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate (New 
York: Basic Books, 2007), 11, 15. 
3 John T. Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the 
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation,” Hastings 






















decision. In the second section, I will compare these argu-
ments to the classic argument in favor of free speech presented 
by John Stuart Mill. In the third section, I will present argu-
ments in favor of hate speech regulation from critical race the-
orists. In the fourth section, I will present responses to these 
critical race theorists from modern scholars who oppose hate 
speech regulation. And in the final section, I will present my 
own critique of the Supreme Court’s decisions and counterar-
guments to the arguments presented by Mill and those oppo-
nents of hate speech regulation discussed in the third section. 
I will also attempt to present a version of hate speech law that 
would allow hate speech to be legally recognized as unac-
ceptable, while avoiding some of the consequences that those 
opposed to hate speech regulation fear.  
 
Supreme Court Cases 
 
The United States Supreme Court cases I will focus 
on are R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Virginia v. Black (referred 
to throughout the rest of this paper as R.A.V. and Virginia, re-
spectively). The first case, R.A.V., concerns a teenager who 
was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance for burning a cross in a black family’s front yard.4 The 
United States Supreme Court found that the St. Paul ordinance 
was “facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise 
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech 
addresses.”5 That is to say, the law was unconstitutional be-
cause it proscribed speech based on its content—it specifically 
targeted speech that “arouses anger... on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender” as legally unacceptable, but 
left speech that arouses anger on other bases protected. The 
court explained that, while the ordinance only applied to bi-
                                               
4 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
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ased speech that constituted “fighting words,” which the Su-
preme Court has recognized as proscribable, it was unconsti-
tutional because it effectively allowed the government to pick 
and choose which topics of fighting words were acceptable 
and which were not. (“Fighting words” is a term for a category 
of speech first recognized as proscribable by the Supreme 
Court in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire and is defined by the 
Court as words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”)6 As Justice 
Antonin Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court, this law 
could create a situation in which one side of a debate could say 
whatever it wanted to, whereas the other side could not—he 
explains this by presenting a hypothetical situation in which a 
person could say “that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegot-
ten; but not that all ‘papists’ are”; and so Catholics would be 
permitted to use whatever language they like, but anti-Catho-
lics would be limited to tamer speech.7 
In the second case, Virginia, the Court examined a law 
which “makes it a felony ‘for any person … , with the intent 
of intimidating any person or group … , to burn … a cross on 
the property of another, a highway or other public place,’ and 
specifies that ‘[a]ny such burning … shall be prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.’”8 The Su-
preme Court held that intimidation is a legitimate exception to 
First Amendment protection, as well as that states could spe-
cifically ban cross burning when the intent of the cross burning 
is to intimidate; however, the Court found the statute uncon-
stitutional as it was written, because of its prima facie assump-
tion that cross burning was always intended to intimidate.9 In 
                                               
6 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942). 
7 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.  
8 Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003). 
9 Note: prima facie comes from the Latin for “at first sight,” and 




















her opinion for the court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor ex-
plained that “the act of burning a cross may mean that a person 
is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation, or it 
may mean only that the person is engaged in core political 
speech.”10  In other words, to assume that cross burning in 
every case is intended to intimidate could be to punish some-
one who burned a cross not in order to intimidate, but rather 
to make a point that contributes to political discussion. Inter-
estingly, the court held that cross burning could be specifically 
banned because of the historical association of cross burning 
with the Ku Klux Klan, known for its extreme racial violence 
and hate speech, but that this was consistent with the decision 
in R.A.V. because the Virginia statute did not specify that cross 
burning was illegal when intended to intimidate based on reli-
gion, race or sex; it simply restricted cross burning in all cases 
in which it was intended to intimidate.  
The Virginia decision could be seen as a victory for 
supporters of hate speech regulation, and it is certainly more 
of a victory than R.A.V., but, as we will see below, its failure 
to specifically condemn racially biased hate speech and the 
Court’s rejection that cross burning can be taken to always im-
ply intimidation, despite the fact that the Court acknowledged 
its association with racial violence and intimidation, means 
that it is not the direct kind of restriction on hate speech that 
hate speech regulation advocates desire. 
 
A Classic Free Speech Argument 
 
As mentioned above, in the United States’ infancy the 
Supreme Court likely would not have been as opposed to spe-
cific content discrimination in either state or federal law as it 
                                               
For more clarification, see the entry on Prima facie in the Wex le-
gal dictionary from Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Insti-
tute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie. 
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is today. While it might seem unbelievable to us now, in 1798 
the Senate passed a bill which criminalized “any false, scan-
dalous and malicious writing or writings against the govern-
ment of the United States, or either house of the Congress… 
or the President.”11 Called the Sedition Act, this law was a di-
rect content restriction on negative writings about the govern-
ment. The arguments used in the United States for shifting 
away from laws such as the Sedition Act echo arguments 
found in John Stuart Mill’s book On Liberty, published in 
1859. In this book, Mill argues that (almost)  no speech should 
be regulated, because all speech, even speech that is consid-
ered “false and pernicious,” can contribute to the exchange of 
ideas and pursuit of truth.12 Mill sees three reasons not to reg-
ulate speech in general. First, he argues that “all silencing of 
discussion is an assumption of infallibility”;13 that is to say, 
when the government chooses to punish certain speech or 
ideas, it is assuming that it knows what the correct opinion 
should be. Mill notes that throughout history, historical figures 
that in Mill’s day were considered great teachers, such as Jesus 
and Socrates, were executed for spreading supposedly bad 
ideas in the time periods in which they lived.14 Another reason 
Mill provides to not regulate even negatively-viewed speech 
is that often, the so-called false opinion and so-called true 
opinion both contain part of the truth; he claims that it is rare 
that one is completely true and the other completely false and, 
therefore, access to both sides of an argument are necessary in 
order to come to the truth.15  
Mill’s next reason not to regulate any kind of speech 
is that any opinion, “however true… if it is not fully, fre-
quently, and fearlessly discussed… will be held as a dead 
                                               
11 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That we Hate, 11. 
12 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Hackett, 
1978), 18–19. 
13 Mill, On Liberty, 17. 
14 Mill, 23.  




















dogma, not a living truth.”16 Mill explains that, in order for an 
idea not to become a dead dogma (that is, a kind of blindly, 
unquestioningly accepted catechism, rather than a compelling 
intellectual idea), those who hold that idea must be exposed to 
objections to that idea. What’s more, he argues, in order for 
the hearer to receive the “most plausible and most persuasive 
form” of the opposing argument, the objections must be pre-
sented by those who believe the so-called false view, rather 
than by someone who simply knows the argument but does not 
believe it.17 This would require those holding the false idea to 
be allowed to speak their beliefs exactly as they believe them, 
rather than presenting the idea in a tame, third-person kind of 
way. 
Mill was specifically concerned with the kind of si-
lencing of religious and political discussion present in England 
and the early United States. Historical speech laws often in-
cluded what would be categorized as content-based re-
strictions on speech that today we recognize as valuable, such 
as political and religious dissent. By restricting certain con-
tent, these laws regulated the ideas presented in the speech, 
rather than simply the aggressive nature or fighting-word sta-
tus of such speech, and were legitimized by arguments that the 
regulated speech was either untrue or of such offensive nature 
that it should not be permitted in public discourse. Under-
standing this context of speech repression is important to un-
derstanding why Mill argued in favor of nearly total freedom 
of speech and why it is now so difficult to argue for regulation 
directed at a specific subject of speech in the United States, 
even when the speech is deeply offensive and recognized to be 
based on untruth, as racially-biased hate speech is. 
It should be noted that Mill allows for some speech (or 
actions in general) to be regulated when such action or speech 
                                               
16 Mill, 34.  
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would cause specific harm to others.18 This idea is often called 
the harm principle. (It can be argued that hate speech directly 
causes harm to others, both physically and mentally, although, 
since Mill’s focus was not on hate speech, he does not address 
this possibility; I will address this idea further in the subse-
quent sections of this paper.) Mill’s only example of a case in 
which speech causes justly regulable harm is the case of a man 
inciting an angry mob by declaring that “corn dealers are starv-
ers of the poor.” 19 Mill explains that, in this case, the speech 
is not regulable because of the idea it expresses, but rather be-
cause it occurs in front of an angry mob gathered at the house 
of a corn dealer and will most likely incite them to harm the 
corn dealer; to Mill, such speech would be acceptable if it did 
not occur in that specific context.20 Because much of what is 
considered hate speech by its broadest definition (which 
would include not only angry incitements to violence but also 
racist speech in general) is not presented in a directly compa-
rable manner to this example, it would seem that Mill would 
only support regulating hate speech that can be seen as a direct 
incitement to harm, if he were to enter the discussion today. 
Mill’s harm principle is similar in many ways to the fighting-
words doctrine discussed in Chaplinksy, R.A.V. and Virginia, 
because the nature of fighting words is to either incite or inflict 
harm.  
 
An Argument from Critical Race Theory 
 
Those who support regulation of racially charged hate 
speech, whether embodied in state legal codes or in the rules 
of public colleges, find themselves in a tight spot in the face 
of the reversal of historical speech laws and current legal doc-
                                               
18 Mill, 9. 
19 Mill, On Liberty, 53. 





















trine on hate speech. Although advocates of hate speech re-
strictions want such restrictions not to end political discussion, 
but rather to protect those people who have historically been 
subject to extreme discrimination and violence based on their 
membership in minority groups (for example, race, gender, re-
ligion, and sexual orientation), such advocates are often des-
ignated as “thought police” by opponents, a designation that 
implies that they do not support open discussion.21 In this sec-
tion, I want to examine the view held by some of the most 
outspoken supporters of hate speech regulation, the critical 
race theorists, and why they think that racially biased hate 
speech can be treated as an exception to the rule that govern-
ment cannot implement content-based restrictions on speech. 
Critical race theory is based on six “defining ele-
ments,” presented in Words That Wound as follows:  
 
Critical race theory recognizes that racism is endemic 
to American life…. Critical race theory expresses 
skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutral-
ity, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy…. 
Critical race theory challenges ahistoricism and in-
sists on a contextual/historical analysis of the law…. 
Critical race theory insists on recognition of the ex-
periential knowledge of people of color… in analyz-
ing law and society…. Critical race theory is inter-
disciplinary and eclectic…. [and] Critical race theory 
works toward the end of eliminating racial oppres-
sion as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of 
oppression.22 
 
                                               
21 Charles R. Lawrence III et. al, eds., introduction to  Words That 
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First 
Amendment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 2. 
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Based on these beliefs and goals, critical race theorists argue 
that racially biased hate speech can be legitimately singled out 
for restriction, despite the fact that this would create a content-
based restriction, because of the long history of racial discrim-
ination such speech embodies and because eliminating such 
speech would help alleviate the still-existing problems faced 
by racial minorities today. The critical race theorists often pro-
vide personal examples of being subjected to hate speech in 
order to support their claims; one such example is a “rash of 
hate tracts [that]… appeared in [their] mail,” an experience 
which caused them to “[walk] more quickly to [their] cars after 
late nights at the office and [to glance] more often over [their] 
shoulders as [they] jogged the trails around [their] cam-
puses.”23 Charles Lawrence III provides another personal ex-
ample, writing about a hate speech incident directed at his own 
family members in which racist drawings, slurs and threats 
were written at the school where his sister and nephews 
worked and attended classes, respectively. 24  Though some 
may argue that crude, slur-filled drawings or anonymous tracts 
may not constitute a true threat, or may only happen rarely and 
therefore not be a widespread enough issue for laws to be spe-
cifically directed at racially biased speech, for critical race the-
orists, the association of such speech with lynching and racial 
discrimination, and the extreme fear caused by being targeted 
by such speech, warrants laws that explicitly target racial hate 
speech. Lawrence notes that hate speech has a silencing effect 
on those it targets; although supposedly still free to speak, the 
shock of being the target of hate speech renders the person tar-
geted unable to respond or participate in the discussion at 
hand, as was the case for one of Lawrence’s students, who 
                                               
23 Lawrence et. al, 7. 
24 Charles R. Lawrence III, “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus” in Words That Wound: Critical Race 
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J. 
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé 




















found himself unable to respond when being verbally attacked 
for being gay.25 This demonstrates another side of the critical 
race theorists’ argument for hate speech regulation, which is 
that the regulation of hate speech may actually be more con-
ducive to a culture of free, open discussion. 
Critical race theorists do not necessarily agree on the 
extent to which hate speech should be regulated by law; Mari 
J. Matsuda, for example, argues that hate speech restriction 
should focus on speech where “the message is of racial inferi-
ority… the message is directed at a historically oppressed 
group… [and] the message is persecutory, hateful, and degrad-
ing.”26 Such a definition of hate speech, although appealing to 
those who support the critical race theorists’ goals, would nat-
urally create the problem of one-sided debate that Justice 
Scalia warned of in R.A.V. and would likely be too broad a 
definition of hate speech to successfully use for legislation.  
On the other hand, Charles R. Lawrence III advocates legisla-
tion that defines proscribable speech simply as “face-to-face 
racial vilification.”27 Lawrence’s description of such speech 
echoes the “fighting words” doctrine mentioned above, which 
was first presented by the United States Supreme Court in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, but focuses it directly at ra-
cially biased hate speech. In fact, Lawrence’s definition of 
hate speech would support a law almost exactly like the law 
thrown out in R.A.V.; it seems that in response to the court’s 
decision, Lawrence would counter that racially biased hate 
speech can be specifically targeted as long as the law is 
worded in a way that allows both sides of any race debate to 
have protection. Based on Lawrence’s definition, it does not 
                                               
25 Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” 53. 
26 Mari J. Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider-
ing the Victim’s Story” in Words that Wound: Critical Race The-
ory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J. 
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993),  36.  
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matter if one is a member of a racial group that has been his-
torically ostracized or has historically been the one that ostra-
cizes—Lawrence, unlike Matsuda, does not specify that hate 
speech regulation should punish only hate speech directed at 
members of historically oppressed racial groups, and in this 
way better avoids the one-sidedness that Scalia lamented in 
R.A.V. while still advocating for law that restricts racial hate 
speech as a category. 
 
Modern Counter-Arguments to Critical Race Theorists 
 
Modern defenders of free speech who oppose critical 
race theorists present a number of reasons not to legislate 
against racially biased hate speech beyond those provided in 
the Supreme Court’s decisions and by Mill.  
First, some opponents of hate speech regulation coun-
ter that government regulations on racist hate speech are un-
warranted because such regulations deny respect for the au-
tonomy of the speaker, which is a key foundation for the 
legitimacy of our government. As C. Edwin Baker argues, “the 
legitimacy of the state depends on its respect for people’s 
equality and autonomy and… as a purely formal matter, the 
state only respects people’s autonomy if it allows people in 
their speech to express their own values – no matter what these 
values are.”28 That is to say, a government is only legitimate if 
it allows people to speak their mind completely and to make 
choices for themselves in what to think, even if their ideas are 
hateful and offensive. It follows from this that to restrict hate 
speech, although it may appear to be a good decision, would 
be to destroy the legitimacy of the government. Baker agrees 
with critical race theorists that the government must also pro-
tect the equality of its citizens, but he adds that this does not 
                                               
28 C. Edwin Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” in Extreme 
Speech and Democracy, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, (Ox-





















mean that the government should punish private citizens for 
saying things that “[do] not respect others’ equality and dig-
nity.”29 Such speech is, to Baker, a matter of choice and per-
sonal belief, rather than a substantial infringement on the 
rights of minorities, and therefore the government should not 
have a say in what people say and believe. The tendency of 
past governments to dictate what people could or could not say 
and believe is the reason we have today developed such a 
strong aversion to speech regulation, and to Baker there is 
more substantial ground to argue that the governments’ re-
striction of hate speech infringes on a person’s right to auton-
omy than to argue that an individual’s use of hate speech in-
fringes on the rights of the individual (or group) targeted by 
the hate speech. 
Another opponent of hate speech regulation, John T. 
Bennett, also addresses critical race theorists’ arguments for 
hate speech regulation. In addition to arguing that government 
should not dictate what can or cannot be said, Bennett ques-
tions the evidence of harms from hate speech. Bennett does 
not deny that there is any evidence whatsoever of harm from 
hate speech; however, he denies that this evidence is so strong 
as to warrant hate speech regulation. Bennett asserts that one 
such harm attributed to hate speech, which is social inequality, 
is not attributable to hate speech and racism after all, but rather 
to “cultural norms that are unrelated to racism.”30 Bennett calls 
this view the “cultural perspective” and explains that “the cul-
tural perspective finds that…various inequalities are caused in 
large part by the distinct norms, habits, and lifestyles of differ-
ent people within different communities.”31 Bennett claims in 
                                               
29 Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” 143. 
30 John T. Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the 
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation,” Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 43 (2016): 478, https://advance-
lexis-com.libproxy.furman.edu/api/permalink/57c4e61b-1f10-
416a-bf13-9586bf0beb9e/?context=1516831. 
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opposition to critical race theorists that inequality as it exists 
in the United States today is not caused by inherent structural 
racism, but rather by “varying norms, habits, preferences, and 
conscious decisions” taken by members of the minority racial 
groups that currently experience unequal outcomes compared 
to members of the majority racial group.32 Put more simply, 
Bennett argues that the inequality experienced today by people 
who have historically been discriminated against because of 
their race is not because of the lingering effects of racism in 
society; instead, he argues that minorities have caused the cur-
rent inequality through their own decisions, and implies that 
blaming these problems on racism, and specifically racist 
speech, is to shift the focus onto the wrong problem.  
Bennett explains further that another harm attributed 
to hate speech, psycho-emotional harm, is also problematic, 
because it is a difficult harm to measure, because it is inher-
ently subjective, and because, according to him, research into 
this harm does not show that hate speech causes long-term 
psychological harm.33 He writes, in an explanation of a study 
which attempted to determine whether hate speech negatively 
impacts self-esteem of young Blacks in the long term using 
data gathered between 1960 and 1998, “if hate speech in 
American society is causing psycho-emotional harm, this has 
not led to a measurable impact on self-reported self-esteem.”34 
Bennett does not deny that those who are targeted by hate 
speech experience any harm whatsoever, but rather argues that 
the evidence of long-lasting harm is not strong enough to war-
rant the level of strict hate speech regulation some critical race 
theorists want. 
Bennett also notes that critical race theorists use em-
pirical data which is gathered by academics who “suffer from 
                                               
 
32 Bennett, 469. 
33 Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech,” 487. 





















deeply rooted and longstanding ideological bias.”35 Bennett 
explains that this bias takes two forms: first, he claims that 
many proponents of hate speech regulation “exaggerate the 
prevalence of racism and sexism in American life,” even as 
racism itself has declined and anti-racism has become the 
norm.36 Second, Bennett notes that this bias results in the ex-
clusion of conservative academics, who (like Bennett) might 
question the prevalence of hate speech and the necessity to 
regulate it. 37  According to Bennett, the currently accepted 
opinion on hate speech among academics has already created 
a culture of speech where, even though certain ideas and 
speech may not be illegal, people are afraid to speak their 
minds because of the possibility of being socially punished—
not for using racially-charged hate speech, but rather for argu-
ing that such speech may not need to be regulated.  
Both Baker and Bennett also address the argument 
that hate speech causes harm, and must therefore be regulated, 
by countering that hate speech regulations may worsen the 
problems that proponents of hate speech regulations want to 
fix. For example, Bennett notes that hate speech regulations 
would be likely to negatively impact racial harmony in the 
United States. He explains that “if hate speech laws were en-
acted, reasonable people would perceive racial favoritism in 
their implementation,” meaning that hate speech regulation 
would be likely to increase animosity between racial groups, 
because such regulations, as presented by scholars such as 
Matsuda, would likely favor one racial group over another.38 
Baker agrees with this, noting that “speech prohibitions can 
increase… racist individuals’ or groups’ sense of oppression 
and, thereby, sense that they must act.”39 He also asserts that 
                                               
35 Bennett, 471. 
36 Bennett, 474. 
37 Bennett, 473. 
38 Bennett, “”The Harm in Hate Speech,” 531. 
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regulation of hate speech will make it more difficult to identify 
potential perpetrators of racial violence, because such regula-
tions will force proponents of hate speech to go underground 
and thereby become harder to trace. 40  So, instead of hate 
speech regulation protecting minority groups from harm, 
Baker and Bennett argue that hate speech regulations will ul-
timately cause more harm. 
 
My Response to the Above Arguments 
 
My own view on hate speech regulation recognizes 
that freedom of speech is a necessary and important freedom 
in any country that claims to value the rights of the people who 
live there; however, I agree with the critical race theorists that 
racially biased hate speech should be an exception to the rule 
and that states can legitimately write laws that punish extreme 
racial hate speech.  
Before completely laying out my own view, I need to 
respond to the arguments against hate speech restriction that 
were presented above. First, in response to Mill: Mill argues 
that all speech must be allowed in order to pursue truth. Alt-
hough I agree that the search for truth is important, I think it is 
difficult to argue that hate speech seriously contributes to the 
pursuit of truth. Of course, there is a possibility of discrimina-
tory, racist speech which may appear to contribute to this 
search for truth, such as in a story that Mari Matsuda calls 
“The Case of the Dead-Wrong Social Scientist,” in which a 
racist argument is portrayed as having scientific backing and 
is presented in a classroom or lecture setting, thereby bearing 
resemblance to actual academic debate and pursuit of truth.41 
However, I think even Mill would be hard-pressed to show 
what benefit or hint of the truth could be found in yelling de-
rogatory names, burning crosses in black families’ yards, or 
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drawing pictures of swastikas outside dorm rooms. At least the 
social scientist, in presenting his racially biased views in an 
academic manner, puts forth his argument in the kind of set-
ting that allows for discussion; that is to say, by presenting his 
views in an academic setting, he seems to invite the possibility 
of the kind of discussion of ideas Mill wants us to have. On 
the other hand, racist speech that takes the form of a slur, a 
display of a hateful symbol, or an act of vandalism does not 
ask for engagement; it seeks to intimidate others into fear and 
silence.  
Also, banning hate speech and banning disagreement 
are not necessarily the same thing. Or, they do not have to be. 
Part of the fear addressed above is that hate speech will be so 
broadly defined as to include speech that should be protected, 
including speech that is merely in opposition to the prevailing 
view. This is one of the potential problems with Matsuda’s 
definition of hate speech. A number of claims made specifi-
cally by Bennett could be considered racist by his readers, re-
gardless of whether he is trying to be racist or not, and there 
are those would argue that all even vaguely racist speech is 
hate speech. Such an argument would make it possible for 
these readers to accuse Bennett of hate speech, even though it 
seems a stretch to call what he says hate speech compared to 
the more extreme examples of hate speech already mentioned. 
This reveals a need to define hate speech specifically, in order 
to avoid creating a culture where those who may not intend to 
cause harm feel like they cannot speak, because they cannot 
ask questions or challenge prevailing views without being ac-
cused of hate speech. For this reason, I find myself leaning 
toward Lawrence’s definition of hate speech as “face-to-face 
racial vilification.”42 However, I would ensure the definition 
included acts that might not be strictly face-to-face, such as 
posting up a poster with demeaning racial images, or display-
ing symbols, such as the swastika or a burning cross, which 
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would likely cause emotional harm by their proximity to mem-
bers of minority groups. Either way, a narrower definition of 
hate speech would allow those with unpopular, and even po-
tentially racist, opinions to still speak their opinions—they just 
would not be able to use words that inherently harm or silence 
others in order to express these opinions. 
Of course, narrowly defining hate speech and recog-
nizing that hate speech does not contribute to a pursuit of truth 
does not seem enough to satisfy Baker and Bennett. Baker says 
that the government must respect its citizens’ autonomy by al-
lowing them to speak their opinions freely and argues that this 
respect must be maintained “irrespective of how this expres-
sive content harms other people.”43 This may just be an unfor-
tunate wording, although it is interesting that, when presenting 
possible evidence that might convince him that hate speech 
regulation would be beneficial, Baker only suggests that he 
would be convinced by evidence showing that hate speech in-
cites racist acts (by racists), and he does not mention that he 
would be convinced if he was shown evidence that hate speech 
harmed its targets in and of itself.44  Allowing someone to 
speak even if it causes harm to another person seems to go 
directly against the purpose of government. I agree with Baker 
that the government must respect the autonomy of its citizens; 
however, the law must put some limits on a person’s autonomy 
in order to protect other people; this is, of course, why there 
are laws against stealing and murder, and why pedophiles can-
not use the argument of sexual autonomy to justify sexual acts 
with minors. A person’s freedom of choice to act ends when 
their action harms another person.  
Hidden within Baker’s statement that speech must be 
freely allowed regardless of harm, is the argument that speech 
does not cause true harm in the same way that murder, steal-
ing, and sexual abuse cause harm. This is interesting, as Baker 
                                               
43 Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” 142. 





















seemingly disagrees with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chaplinsky, because the Court’s definition of fighting words, 
as quoted above, recognizes that certain words can cause 
harm.  
Bennett’s specific arguments against hate speech, on 
the other hand, are somewhat more controversial. First, his ar-
gument that inequality is not caused by racism seems quite 
false; even if it is true that not all current inequality is caused 
directly by racism, there are cases where racism can be shown 
to underly situations of inequality. This can be seen specifi-
cally in the higher incarceration rates of Blacks for drug 
crimes, despite whites being a larger portion of the drug user 
population, as well as in more severe sentences for Blacks ver-
sus whites when similar crimes are committed.45 Second, Ben-
nett, unlike Baker, allows that hate speech may cause actual 
harm to those targeted by it, but he denies that it is enough 
harm to warrant restriction. It is interesting to note that the 
study Baker uses to demonstrate that hate speech does not 
cause long-term harm focuses on the impact of hate speech on 
self-esteem, and does not address other long-term psycho-
emotional harms that may occur, such as fear of going to cer-
tain locations (such as a classroom or a dorm where one was 
subject to hate speech). It seems both Bennett and Baker reject 
the personal experience of those targeted by racist hate speech. 
If you ask the Black family who was directly targeted by the 
burning cross at the heart of the controversy in R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, would they say there was no long-term psychological 
harm? In the example mentioned above, in which Lawrence’s 
family was targeted by racist drawings, he writes that, on vis-
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iting his family after the incident, the pain and injury was ob-
vious, that “their faces betrayed the aftershock of a recently 
inflicted blow and a newly discovered vulnerability.”46 Could 
Bennett and Baker deny that such an experience would not 
have long-term effects on Lawrence’s family, especially the 
children who realized they went to school with people who 
were willing to say such things about them? It is possible that 
more commonplace, subtle racist speech  may not have meas-
urable long-term effects (although I am not totally convinced 
this is true), but it seems difficult and wrong to deny the indi-
vidual experience of those targeted directly by the most violent 
and direct instances of hate speech.  
The question also arises of why it matters to have ra-
cially biased hate speech regulation specifically, if such hate 
speech could fall under legislation, such as the law in Virginia, 
that regulates fighting words in general. Simply proscribing 
hate speech within more general fighting words laws might 
appeal to Bennett, since, as discussed above, he says that rea-
sonable people will see restrictions that specifically regulate 
hate speech as favoring one side over another, and that aca-
demics who support such legislation are deeply biased. Ben-
nett is probably right in saying that racial hate speech ordi-
nances will tend to favor one side over another, even if not 
written in a way that asks for such one-sided application, see-
ing as it likely would be more difficult (but not impossible) for 
a white person to show that she is the victim of hate speech 
than it would be for a Black person, Jewish person, or person 
of any other minority group. It is also more likely that people 
of color will bring up allegations of hate speech and win, be-
cause people of color are more often targeted by hate speech 
and hate crimes (however, it should be noted again that whites 
would also be able to be recognized as victims of hate speech 
under the kind of hate speech laws I am arguing for, just as 
whites can and have been recognized as victims of hate crimes 
                                               
 




















under current hate crime laws).47 This seemingly unfair appli-
cation comes about because derogatory speech and symbols 
directed at a white person do not carry with them the same 
history of oppression that such speech directed at a person of 
another race would. However, this same history of oppression 
is exactly what motivates those academics who support hate 
speech regulation. They may appear to be biased, but this is 
because most critical race theorists are themselves members of 
minority groups who have experienced extreme discrimina-
tion in United States history; in a sense, regulation specifically 
directed at hate speech is a small way of making up for the 
hundreds of years in which people of color were excluded 
from government, openly discriminated against, enslaved, and 
beaten all because of their ethnicity and skin color.  
Again, I admit that this sort of argument can be 
viewed as biased against a specific category of disfavored 
speech; however, I do not think there is inherently something 
wrong with different treatment of disfavored speech in this 
case. Hate speech is different from other sorts of disfavored 
speech, such as anti-government and anti-war speech, which 
have also been historically been targeted by speech regulation 
in the United States.48 The latter two forms of speech are po-
litical speech which attack the government and can reasonably 
be seen to contribute to the search for truth because of their 
nature as political speech. However, racially biased hate 
speech specifically attacks people based on nothing other than 
their race, and, as mentioned above, cannot reasonably be con-
sidered a part of the search for truth.  
I need to also address Baker and Bennett’s arguments 
that hate speech regulation will unintentionally cause more 
                                               
47 See Wen Cheng, William Ickes, and Jared B. Kenworthy, “The 
Phenomenon of Hate Crimes in the United States,” Journal of Ap-
plied Social Psychology 43, no. 4 (2013): 761–794, https://doi-
org.libproxy.furman.edu/10.1111/jasp.12004. 
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harm. Bennett’s reason for this argument relates to the argu-
ment just mentioned, which is that “reasonable people would 
perceive racial favoritism in their implementation.”49 As I al-
ready said, I think this is true, but I also think many reasonable 
people are capable of recognizing that the problem addressed 
by hate speech regulation carries with it a history that allows 
for an exception to the rule that law cannot be biased against 
certain ideas. And even if reasonable people disagree with this 
(I will not claim that Bennett or Baker are unreasonable peo-
ple), they are unlikely to lash out at minority groups if hate 
speech laws are enacted. The problem, then, seems to lie with 
unreasonable people; that is to say, those who want to use the 
most violent hate speech: hate groups, such as Neo-Nazis and 
white supremacists. As mentioned before, Baker says that hate 
speech regulation will cause such unreasonable people to feel 
attacked and “increase… [their] sense that they must act,” as 
well as force them to move underground where their ideas can 
fester.50 This is a difficult argument to counter. First, I argue 
that hate speech regulation would not necessarily force these 
groups entirely underground, because, as I have already ad-
mitted, I do not think that hate speech regulation can be 
worded to include every instance of racist speech, but only the 
most hurtful forms of direct racial vilification. Second, if by 
increasing the sense that they must act, Baker means that these 
groups will be prompted to use more violence, then that simply 
goes to show that racist ideas in fact are still prevalent enough 
to cause concern, which disproves Bennett’s assertion that rac-
ism is no longer a big enough issue to warrant hate speech leg-
islation. Also, even though hate groups might claim that being 
targeted by hate speech regulation is a legitimate reason to use 
violence, such an argument would not hold up in any court. 
This may show that the government needs to do a better job of 
                                               
49 Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech,” 531. 




















identifying and monitoring those who might be likely to com-
mit hate crimes, but it does not show that we should not protect 
the victims of hate speech by directly punishing hate speech 
through legislation. It seems more important to protect those 
that are actually harmed by hate speech, rather than those who 





Ultimately, the debate over hate speech regulation is 
difficult to resolve, and it is admittedly likely that racism will 
find ways to persist even if we accept the need for hate speech 
regulation and enact laws restricting such speech. Despite 
these difficulties, the battle to criminalize hate speech is wor-
thy to be fought, as it provides a way for the United States and 
its state governments to both protect minorities from the very 
real harm that comes from being targeted by hate speech and 
to legally recognize the crimes such speech has historically en-
couraged and embodied as wrong. The goal of hate speech re-
striction is not to end debate; hate speech regulation, specifi-
cally limited to racially-biased fighting words and “face-to-
face vilification,” will still allow for free expression of even 
racist ideas; but it will require that the expression of such ideas 
not occur in such a way to inflict harm on the minority groups 
who have already suffered so much harm throughout United 
States history. I would love to live in a world where hate 
speech regulation is not necessary, but as I have shown, we do 
not yet live in such a world. It is for these reasons that I not 
only argue we need hate speech regulation, but that I also dis-
agree with the Court’s decisions in R.A.V. and Virginia and 
conclude that the Court should allow future such laws to re-
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DISMANTLING POWER STRUCTURES: 
A FOUCAULDIAN EXAMINATION OF PHYLLIDA LLOYD’S 





T. E. Phyllida Lloyd’s trilogy of Julius Caesar (2012), 
Henry IV (2014), and The Tempest (2016) produced at Donmar 
Warehouse in London (which was filmed at the conclusion of 
the five-year project) successfully tells Shakespeare’s stories 
using a company of female actors who not only take on the 
roles called for in the scripts, but also the roles of inmates in a 
women’s prison. In an interview for Shakespeare Unlimited, a 
podcast sponsored by the Folger Shakespeare Library, Lloyd 
explained that the company worked with Holloway Prison in 
London to dive deeper into the implications of their choice of 
setting. She said that through the development process the 
“prison became less a device and more absolutely fundamental 
to [their] mission.”1 What began as a project meant to provide 
a wider range of opportunities for women within the Shake-
speare canon became a vehicle to highlight the struggles of 
inmates limited by the penal system and their pasts. And, not 
surprisingly, we can come to a better understanding of these 
struggles if we think about these productions in terms of the 
ideas of French philosopher Michel Foucault. 
Foucault was one of the most prominent figures in the 
post-structuralist era of literary criticism. He wrote Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison to investigate the penal 
system, identify its origins, and question how it may be re-
formed. Foucault discusses the power structures at play within 
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a prison as a microcosm of society and how those power struc-
tures are perpetuated. Applying his ideas to Lloyd’s trilogy il-
luminates that her production concept links the power struc-
tures of Shakespeare’s plays to the power structures in prisons, 
which, in turn, highlights the heightened circumstances of in-
carcerated women.  
The plays, as one can imagine, are aesthetically rather 
dreary. Grey sets and costumes, as well as harsh overhead 
lighting and found objects, are used to create the prison. How-
ever, this design is effective in emphasizing the barrenness of 
prison life and forcing a focus on the stories being told. It is 
clear that each actor in the company has a deep understanding 
of not only the Shakespearean character they embody, but also 
the character of the inmate who performs from within her 
prison confines in all three productions.  
To supplement the trilogy, the company put together 
an educational packet that includes a video diary featuring 
monologues from the point of view of the inmate characters. 
The actors wrote the monologues after meeting with the incar-
cerated women in the prison that were selected to work with 
Lloyd. These monologues give interested audiences more con-
text for the prison setting and tell the stories of the fictional 
incarcerated characters behind the Shakespearean characters. 
Most notable of these diaries is that of Hannah, an inmate 
played by Dame Harriet Walter (who, Lloyd noted in her 
Shakespeare Unlimited interview, inspired the trilogy).2 Han-
nah plays Brutus in Julius Caesar, King Henry in Henry IV, 
and Prospero in The Tempest. She serves as the leader of the 
drama group and as a mentor for the younger women in the 
company. In Walter’s video diary (in character as Hannah), 
she describes the process of rehearsing the plays. She delves 
into how she and the other women were stripped of their iden-
tities when they were incarcerated, becoming just a number, 
                                               




















“an offender” instead of an individual. But the plays them-
selves act as “purgative” for the (fictional) inmates as they re-
form and learn to grow within the confines of the prison.3 In 
this sense, the plays reveal the kinds of power, however lim-
ited, the women could exercise for themselves. And this is a 
key element in Foucault’s philosophy of power. 
Foucault defines power as a verb, not a noun. To him, 
it is not a possession, but something one enacts.  He says, “it 
is not the 'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the dominant 
class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions.”4 In other 
words, power is the culmination of an action and the effects of 
that action on another person or group of people. Everyone 
can, and does, exercise power, even if they’re not in a privi-
leged position. The ability to exercise power is made possible 
through continuous demonstrations of power that are accepted 
by those being acted upon, effectively maintaining the struc-
ture.  
Lloyd’s trilogy centers around such demonstrations of 
power that permeate the lives of the incarcerated women. At 
the start of Donmar’s Julius Caesar, inmate Charday (played 
by Jade Anouka) welcomes the audience saying, “We’ve cho-
sen the plays for our trilogy because they’re the ones that con-
nected to our stories.”5 Julius Caesar tells the story of taking 
down a corrupt government only to be replaced by a new one, 
demonstrating the cyclical nature of power-grabbing. Henry 
                                               
3 The Prison Context: Prison Character Introductions. Perfomance 
by Harriet Walter, Donmar Warehouse, 2017.  
4 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, Inc., 1995), 26-
27. 
5 Julius Caesar, directed by Phyllida Lloyd (2017; London, Eng-
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IV explores the line between peasantry and royalty and ques-
tions if one can be honorable and common. The Tempest, 
though the most fantastical of the three stories, stays grounded 
in its examination of isolation and servitude. The themes of 
power, justice, and freedom that permeate all three plays are 
only amplified when the actors represent women who are in-
carcerated.  
Though there are certainly oppressive power struc-
tures present in all three of the plays chosen for the trilogy, 
Shakespeare capitalizes on the Foucauldian notion of power as 
a verb rather than a noun. In The Tempest, Prospero demon-
strates power over Ariel by binding them to servitude with the 
promise eventual freedom. Ariel does his bidding because they 
believe if they work hard enough and do what they are asked, 
they will escape servitude.6 It can be said, then, that Ariel is 
complicit in Prospero’s exercises of power and, therefore, ex-
ercises power of their own. Ariel implicates this early on in 
Act One of the play by saying the following: 
 
All hail, great master, grave sir, hail! I come  
 To answer thy best pleasure; be’t to fly, 
To swim, to dive into the fire, to ride 
On the curl’d clouds. To thy strong bidding, task 
Ariel and all his quality. (I.ii.189-193)7 
 
Ariel chooses to operate within Prospero’s system and assert 
their magical powers over others (a physical demonstration of 
power, rather than power granted by a privileged position). 
Shakespeare’s Henry IV revolves around two men 
fighting for a position of power, but the action that leads up to 
that provides more complex examples of power-grabbing. 
Prince Hal has a privileged position of power as a royal, but 
                                               
6 William Shakespeare, “The Tempest,” in The Riverside Shake-
speare (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997). 




















Hal exercises power by subverting that position, “mak[ing] of-
fense a skill”.8 He chooses to steal and drink instead of per-
forming his princely duties, knowing that he will never face 
the consequences of a common man (like fines or arrests).9 He 
waits to own up to his privileged position in hopes that, after 
behaving as a ne’er-do-well, his acts as prince will come as a 
shock and make him seem more successful. Hal summarizes 
this plot in one of his most famous speeches: 
 
 I know you all, and will a while uphold 
 The unyok’d humor of your idleness, 
 Yet herein will I imitate the sun, 
 Who doth permit the base contagious clouds 
 To smother up his beauty from the world, 
 That when he please again to be himself, 
 Being wanted, he may be more wond’red at 
 By breaking through the foul and ugly mists 
 Of vapors that did seem to strangle him. 
(I.ii.195-203) 
 
Like Prince Hal, Falstaff challenges his status in life 
and the power structures of his society. Falstaff does not have 
a position of power, but consistently exercises power in a Fou-
cauldian sense by undermining those who actually have au-
thority. Shakespeare gives Falstaff, seemingly the lowest on 
the social totem pole, one of the largest demonstrations of 
power in the play: acting as a father and counsel for Hal when 
Hal dismisses King Henry.10 Because he is a thief and a drunk-
ard, however, Falstaff is not always successful in his exercises 
                                               
8 William Shakespeare, “The First Part of Henry the Fourth,” 
in The Riverside Shakespeare (New York: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1997), 893. 
9 Shakespeare, “The First Part of Henry the Fourth,” 893.   
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of power. At the conclusion of the play, Hal steps into his po-
sition of power and abandons Falstaff,11 an act Falstaff does 
not challenge because the existing power structure dictates 
that he must remain docile or face consequences. 
Similarly to Henry IV, Julius Caesar questions if there 
is such a thing as ideal power and, if so, what that power looks 
like. Caesar is unpopular and, therefore, those ranked below 
him choose to exercise their power against him. Early in the 
play, Cassius explains to Brutus that Caesar is no more fit to 
rule than they are, claiming,  
 
 The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, 
 But in ourselves, that we are underlings. 
 Brutus and Caesar: what should be in that “Caesar”? 
 Why should that name be sounded more than yours? 
 Write them together, yours is as fair a name; 
 Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well;  
 Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with ‘em, 
 “Brutus” will start a spirit as soon as “Caesar.”  
 Now in the name of all the gods at once, 
 Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed 
 That he is grown so great? (I.ii.140-150)12 
 
Discontent rises and the senators kill Caesar in favor 
of a better leader, exercising power from below, but the exist-
ing power structure doesn’t die with him. Caesar’s successor 
challenges Cassius and Brutus and no real change is made. In 
that, Shakespeare suggests, aligning with a Foucauldian para-
digm of power, that there will never be an “ideal” leader be-
cause power will always come from everyone, not just a single 
body.  
                                               
11 William Shakespeare, “The Second Part of Henry the Fourth,” 
in The Riverside Shakespeare (New York: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1997), 964. 
12 William Shakespeare, “Julius Caesar,” in The Riverside Shake-




















With all three productions set in a prison, a looming 
power structure is apparent between the guards and the in-
mates acting in the plays. The act of the inmates performing 
the plays, however, is an exercise of power that reinforces 
Foucauldian ideals rather than the traditional concept of power 
typically associated with the prison complex. The guards ex-
hibit their power by leading the inmates in and out of the play-
ing space, making sure the women stay in line and conform. 
In fact, the plays are only allowed to be performed (in the 
world of the prison) because the guards permit the inmates to 
participate in Hannah’s drama club, but the threat of the per-
formance being taken away is always an underlying possibility 
if people misbehave.  
This assumption is confirmed in Henry IV during the 
tavern scene where Mistress Quickly is antagonized and the 
inmates go off script. They add in a bit that they had suppos-
edly rehearsed and agreed to cut where they call the inmate 
playing Mistress Quickly “an otter” because she is “slippery” 
in her sex life and use derogatory anatomical slang which 
sends the inmate playing Quickly off stage crying. A guard 
enters, followed by Hannah (who has stepped out of her char-
acter of King Henry), to assess the situation. The guard says 
nothing, but her presence makes the inmates visibly uncom-
fortable. She represents an upset in the power structure and an 
attempt to regain control. Hannah reminds the inmates to be-
have and “stick to the Shakespeare,” then exercising power 
which has been granted to her because the other inmates re-
spect her. Unlike the authoritative imposed power of the 
guard, Hannah’s exhibition of power is defensive and, there-
fore, well-received.13 In this instance, Hannah is defending the 
power of the play and the power the inmates have exercised in 
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their performance that allows them to rise above their circum-
stances and create their own meaning out of Shakespeare’s 
texts.  
Similarly, in The Tempest, Hannah (this time playing 
Prospero) exercises her power to defend the powers of the 
play. Prospero delivers the famous “we are such stuff as 
dreams are made on” speech while popping large balloons 
that, only moments before, were used as the backdrop for pro-
jections of the dreams of the inmates, including the golden 
arches of McDonald’s and the promise of something as simple 
as a cheeseburger.14 Prospero’s balloon popping, a physical 
demonstration of power, is done in order to keep the other 
characters grounded in his world instead of venturing into a 
vision of the world that would leave him isolated. The other 
women do not challenge this act of power, effectively main-
taining the overarching structure of power at play between the 
characters and the inmates.  
Despite this, the guards demonstrate their power in 
other ways throughout the trilogy, such as interrupting the ac-
tion of the plays during pivotal moments when the incarcer-
ated women exercise power to rebel against injustice in the 
existent power structure. Julius Caesar is cut short at the 
crowning of Octavius because the guards, seemingly worried 
that the inmates’ excitement might get out of hand, declare that 
recreation time is over. After Hal renounces Falstaff in Henry 
IV, the actor playing Falstaff (Sophie Stanton) begins to 
scream and cry and the guards don’t allow the other inmates 
to continue. The inmates hit the floor and wait for further in-
struction, physically demonstrating how they are below the 
guards in the power structure. It can be assumed that the in-
mates have been trained to obey the orders of the guards un-
questioningly in such situations or risk consequences. Since 
                                               
14 The Tempest, directed by Phyllida Lloyd (2017; London, Eng-






















both of these moments of interruption occur at points when an 
underdog has successfully disrupted the existing power struc-
ture, the guards step in as a reminder to the audience that the 
women being watched on stage are unable to enact reform 
within the power structure of the prison outside of perfor-
mance. They have, however, proven that they are capable of 
exercising power even though they don’t hold a privileged po-
sition, reinforcing Foucault’s notion that an act of power can 
come from anyone, not just those at the top of the social pyra-
mid.  
The key example that exhibits a Foucauldian power 
structure is that of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. The panop-
ticon is a circular prison model where a single watchtower can 
see every cell in the prison. In this model, prisoners don’t 
know when they’re being watched but know that they theoret-
ically always can be seen, meaning power could be asserted 
over the prisoners both physically and mentally at any time. 
Foucault expands and comments upon Bentham’s model, say-
ing the idea of the panopticon trickles into society at large, re-
flecting a looming authoritative body in power that cannot be 
reached. This causes those being monitored to internalize the 
rules of the oppressive body, which ultimately leads to a self-
disciplined society that voluntarily yields its power.15  
The Lloyd trilogy effectively demonstrates the con-
stant surveillance of the prison without distracting from the 
action of the play. In all three productions, guards lead the in-
mates into the playing space before they begin their perfor-
mance and escort them out at the play’s conclusion, staying in 
the wings near the perimeter during the performance. Though 
not consistently visible, they come in and out during scene 
transitions or in moments of conflict in the plot. Around the 
top of the audience is a fence, allowing guards and prisoners 
not on stage to monitor what’s happening. On a practical level, 
this reinforces the prison setting for the audience but also 
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serves to remind the inmates that though they may be escaping 
their situations by putting on a character, they cannot misbe-
have or abuse the privilege of performance. With constant sur-
veillance comes the threat of punishment. Julius Caesar, in 
particular, uses surveillance and its potential consequences as 
a tool for the story. Television monitors are present around the 
space and the threat of media surveillance adds higher stakes 
for the conspirators plotting against Caesar.   
There’s a level of Panopticon-esque surveillance that 
becomes even more prevalent when theatricality is taken into 
account. In a theater, it can be argued that the audience be-
comes the guard in the tower watching the action of the prison 
taking place but remaining distanced from the prisoners, or ac-
tors, themselves. The actors are in a position where they could 
be seen by any number of the 400 audience members at any 
time, whether they are the main focus of the scene or not, mak-
ing it imperative to always be “on.” In other words, the power 
to behave in a way that deviates from the behavior expected of 
them is stripped and they, like the prisoners in the Panopticon 
model, must conform to the expectations of the power struc-
ture (in this case, the expectations of what makes a good, in-
teresting to watch actor). However, part of what makes theater 
impactful is that there is power in subverting expectations. 
Though actors may be expected to behave in one way, the 
women in this company have exerted their power to take on 
roles not written for them that challenge their and the audi-
ences’ understanding of themselves.  
Yet the audience-as-guard model isn’t the only one 
that exists in the trilogy. Perhaps the audience is not in the 
tower at all but instead act as the imprisoned, stuck in their 
seats waiting to be called out or directly addressed without 
having control over the story being handed to them and pow-
erless when faced with the power exercised by the performers. 
In Donmar’s Julius Caesar, the audience has no idea Caesar is 




















way to stop it; they sit and are forced to take it in.16 This action 
places the audience in the shoes of the inmates who are con-
sistently acted upon by an outside force and given little agency 
over their situation and must find ways to exercise their power 
from within. From a more purpose-driven perspective, the ac-
tors teach the audience or leave them with a message of some 
sort; in this case, that message is to question the power struc-
tures in place that are being overturned by Shakespeare’s char-
acters and the ones that limit the inmates. The audience then 
has the opportunity to exercise their own power beyond the 
stage using the knowledge they’ve gained from both Shake-
speare’s words and the interpretation presented by Lloyd and 
company.  
Lloyd’s concept for the trilogy has revolutionized 
contemporary Shakespeare performance by challenging gen-
der norms on stage as well as in the eyes of society, while sim-
ultaneously calling into question the beliefs largely held about 
incarcerated women and the structures within which they op-
erate. Hannah’s supplementary inmate introduction video dis-
cussed the erasure of individual stories and lamented their 
grouping into the singular category of “offender.” Lloyd and 
the company of these three plays have effectively highlighted 
individual stories of inmates and grounded them in universal 
human truths that make it almost impossible for audience 
members to avoid empathizing with both Shakespeare’s char-
acters and the characters of the inmates. In doing this, Lloyd 
has given voice to those typically oppressed by existing power 
structures in prisons, on stage, and in society at large.   
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THE SWORD, THE STAFF, AND  
WISE LEADERSHIP:  







Although often first associated with religious conno-
tations, Dante Alighieri’s Commedia—or in modern vernacu-
lar, The Divine Comedy—also advances a clear political 
agenda. Rather in the theme of the epic poets (and suitably so, 
considering that his first great poetic muse is none other than 
Dante’s guide in the poem, the poet Virgil), Dante weaves a 
complex narrative discussion of the political and religious dis-
array he perceives in the world around him. Among his many 
other criticisms of secular politics, Dante addresses this issue 
in a critical depiction of local Florentine politics (representa-
tive of city) and Italian government (representative of state), 
and a celebration of imperial Rome (representative of Em-
pire).1 In his wider examination of the matter, however, he es-
pecially considers the proper relationship between temporal 
spiritual and political authority in Purgatorio, the second book 
in the Commedia. Likely responding to the political and eccle-
siastical corruption caused by the politicization of religious of-
fices in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Dante expresses 
strong (and sometimes controversial) opinions about the 
proper alignment of Church and State in medieval Europe. 
Dante was immersed in political thought that was influenced 
                                               
1 Dante uses the terms “empire” and “monarchy” interchangeably 
throughout both De Monarchia and Commedia to represent a sin-
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significantly by the Augustinian notion that the “city of God” 
(Church) is in constant and irreconcilable conflict with the 
“city of man” (government, or State). Conversely, Dante sug-
gests that the telos—or end—of Church and State align such 
that both are essential for human fulfillment. While he clings 
to this theme throughout Commedia, his analogies of the cleft 
hooves and the two suns in Purgatorio XVI offer clear insight 
into his belief that a proper arrangement of ecclesiastical and 
imperial powers is necessary for their ideal teleological func-
tion. Read alongside Book III of his political treatise, De Mo-
narchia, the two analogies reveal three defining characteristics 
of the proper relationship between political and religious au-
thorities: first, that there is no structural hierarchy between the 
two powers; second, that each exists independent of the au-
thority of the other; and third, that, as a result of the former 
points, the structural differentiation of political and ecclesias-
tical authorities facilitates the fulfillment of their similar tele-
ological ends.  
Purgatorio is the second installment of Dante’s three-
part epic poem, Commedia. Commedia tracks the journey of 
Dante-the-Traveler (as opposed to Dante-the-Author) from 
ante-Hell in Inferno to the Beatific Vision in Paradiso, touch-
ing on themes such as justice, penitence, and redemption 
throughout. After emerging from the bottommost of the nine 
concentric circles of Hell in Inferno, Dante and his guide, Vir-
gil, enter the gates of Purgatorio and begin ascending the 
mountain. Mt. Purgatory contains seven terraces arranged ver-
tically, each of which represents a specific vice of which souls 
are purged through contrapasso (literally, “suffering the con-
trary”); simultaneously, these contrapassi cultivate the virtue 
which corresponds to the one being purged. The journey 
through Purgatorio is thus one of growth and redemption in 
addition to justice; it is a walk of spiritual maturation that 
prunes the soul to prepare it for the Beatific Vision in Para-
diso—the event which, according to Dante, is the fulfillment 
of all human longings and needs. As such, Purgatorio pro-




















virtue and vice: whereas the souls in Inferno are already 
damned for eternity, and those in Paradiso have already 
reached perfection, the souls in Purgatorio are in the middle 
ground. It is the land of the imperfect on the way to perfection, 
a process which requires criticism and justice to reach redemp-
tion. Dante embraces this notion in the criticism of the political 
and religious landscape of fourteenth century Italy throughout 
Purgatorio. 
Purgatorio is riddled with political significance from 
the beginning: within the first thirty lines of Canto 1 (and still 
in ante-purgatory) Dante encounters Cato, a Roman statesman 
and military leader known for choosing suicide over submis-
sion to tyranny.2 Cato’s placement at the beginning of Purga-
torio is a clear political statement, since he rightfully belongs 
in the seventh circle of Inferno alongside the other souls who 
are damned for committing suicide. Although a highly debated 
matter, most commentators argue that his saving grace is his 
dedication to the virtuous polis (the Ancient Greek term for a 
city-state or nation). Cato is not saved, nor is he in a state of 
active purgation; but he is also not suffering. In placing Cato 
at the opening to Purgatorio, Dante insinuates that proper po-
litical dispositions do play a role human fulfillment but are not 
enough by themselves. The political nature of his introduction 
to Purgatorio frames his later criticism of the relationship be-
tween Church and State in Purgatorio XVI.   
Dante sets the stage for his criticism of the relationship 
between political and religious authority in Purgatorio XVI 
with the setting in which he places the dialogue between 
Dante-the-traveler and Marco the Lombard at the beginning of 
the canto. Upon ascending the third terrace of Mt. Purgatory 
(the terrace of the wrathful), a harsh, impenetrable smog en-
gulfs Dante in greater darkness than is found at any other point 
in the poem. Under this veil, he encounters Marco the Lom-
bard, a Venetian nobleman whose political views were likely 
                                               
2 Alighieri, Dante. Purgatorio: A New Verse Translation, trans. Robert 
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sympathetic to Dante’s own, and seeks his counsel while at-
tempting to understand the root causes of earthly depravity. 
Robert Hollander argues that this unparalleled darkness repre-
sents the blinding nature of anger, an idea consistent with the 
theme of this specific terrace.3 Yet, the remarkable similarities 
between the description of the smog and the language that 
Marco later uses to discuss moral turpitude implies that the 
smog may also be a metaphor for the effects of temporal po-
litical and ecclesiastical corruption. Just as the “barren sky” is 
the source of the blinding darkness in the third terrace, so the 
barrenness of virtue shrouds the world in blinding darkness.4 
Explaining the reason for this barrenness, Marco engages 
Dante the traveler in a brief discussion of the roles of free will, 
human culpability and innocence, and astrological influence 
while shrouded in the smog. Marco’s ultimate conclusion is 
that “failed guidance / is the cause the world is steeped in vice, 
/ and not [the] inner nature that has grown corrupt”—in other 
words, the world is blind because its leaders have failed, not 
because humanity has grown more decrepit. By the time he 
finishes explaining this, the smog has begun to dissipate. 5 
With this glimpse into the way Dante sees the world around 
him as further framework, he employs the analogies of the 
cleft hooves and the two suns to explain the corrupt relation-
ship between temporal political and ecclesiastical authorities.  
The conflict between papal and imperial authority first 
emerges in Purgatorio XVI when Marco offers the analogy of 
the cleft hooves. Discussing the importance of law for virtuous 
society, he argues that the civil law that already exists cannot 
be enforced effectively because “the shepherd who precedes / 
may chew his cud, but does not have cleft hooves.”6 In his 
1901 commentary on Purgatorio, H. F. Tozer explains that 
                                               
3 Hollander, Robert. “Purgatorio XVI,” Commentaries on the Com-
media Divinia. New York: Anchor, 2004: 160. 
4 Purg. XVI.1-12;58-66.  
5 Ibid., XVI.103-105. 




















chewing the cud is allegory for acquiring wisdom through the 
contemplation, and contends that the cleft hooves refer to a 
separation of religious and political powers. 7  While Tozer 
draws from the image of the beast stumbling in the mud in 
Monarchia II.127-9 (which also correlates with Purgatorio 
XVI.126-9) as evidence for his interpretation, he notes that 
reading the analogy as an allusion to Leviticus better clarifies 
its significance for the ideal relationship between Church and 
State. Leviticus 11 distinguishes ceremonially clean animals 
from ceremonially unclean animals. In verse 3, Moses estab-
lishes that only animals that both have “completely split 
hooves and chew the cud” are ceremonially clean.8 The allu-
sion thus compares the ceremonial uncleanliness of a camel 
(which chews the cud but does not have split hooves) with the 
Pope—the wise shepherd of the Church who corrupts his of-
fice by lusting after political power. Given the understanding 
that consuming unclean animals defiled the consumer and al-
ienated them from God, it seems that Dante alludes to Leviti-
cus 11 in the analogy of the cleft hooves to suggest that the 
Pope’s failure to separate political and religious powers de-
filed the world and undermined its potential for good.  
Where Dante complains about his current political and 
religious landscape in the analogy of the split hooves, he pro-
poses an alternative balance of powers in the analogy of the 
two suns, which emphasizes the ideal arrangement of Church 
and State, and introduces its teleological significance. Shortly 
after attributing worldly vice to failed guidance, Marco states 
that, “Rome, which formed the world for good, / once had two 
suns that lit the one road / and the other, the world’s and that 
to God.”9 The two suns are the Pope and the emperor, who, 
ideally, ought to illuminate the paths to earthly and eternal 
                                               
7 H.F. Tozer. “Purgatorio XVI,” An English Commentary on 
Dante’s Divinia Commedia. Ed. Andrew Shiflett (Oxford, Claren-
don Press, 1901): 99, http://dantelab.dartmouth.edu/reader.  
8 Leviticus 11:1-8, NRSV. 
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happiness, respectively; they also identify Rome as the epit-
ome of human government.10 Identifying Rome as the ultimate 
exemplar of government establishes it as the standard to which 
other governments ought to (and usually fail to) meet. The 
analogy of the sword and staff reaffirms this interpretation in 
the next tercet through direct reference to well-known symbols 
of imperial and pastoral power: the sword represents emperor, 
the staff the Pope. In addition to modifying the analogy of the 
two suns to clarify potential misinterpretations assigning it any 
significance other than the personification of religious and po-
litical powers, the analogy underlines the inevitable dysfunc-
tion that results from their unnatural combination: the “two,/ 
forced to be together, must perforce go ill.”11 The notable con-
trast between the association of the independent Roman eccle-
siastical and political powers with light and the association of 
their overlap in medieval politics with the putrid smog hover-
ing over Purgatorio XVI insinuates that the structural separa-
tion of Church and State is more conducive to clear vision—
and therein, truth and virtue. In addition to signifying the need 
for structural differentiation between religious and political 
authorities, John S. Carroll argues that the analogy of the two 
suns indicates that man has “a twofold end in life” which cor-
relates with the two temporal authorities: to discover happi-
ness in the world (emperor), and to discover eternal life 
(Pope). According to Carroll, Dante evokes imperial Rome as 
the epitome of earthly religious and political power and the 
ultimate exemplar of political authority in his analogy of the 
two suns to emphasize the significance of separating political 
and religious power, and evinces the dual end of humanity.12  
                                               
10 Hollander, “Purgatorio XVI,” 168 
11 Purg. XVI.109-11 
12 John S. Carroll, “Prisoners of Hope (Purgatorio),” Expositions of 
Dante’s Divinia Commedia. Ed. Robert Hollander with Andrew 





















 While Dante ardently supports the separation of 
Church and State powers, he neglects systematic explanation 
of just what their proper alignment looks like in the Comme-
dia. Instead, he reinforces and clarifies his arguments from 
Commedia in Book III of De Monarchia. Published sometime 
between his exile in 1302 and his death in 1321, De Monarchia 
divides the foundations of Dantean political theory in three 
categories: 1) the need for monarchy (Book I); 2) the ideal 
monarchy (Book II); and 3) the origins of monarchial authority 
(Book III).13 Monarchia III refutes what Dante believes are 
nine prominent misinterpretations of the relationship between 
ecclesiastical and political powers, with arguments employing 
Biblical, anagogical, historical, and logical evidence. In these, 
he underscores three fundamental principles about the struc-
tural relationship between political and religious authority: 1) 
there is no existential interdependence between the two enti-
ties; 2) there is no structural hierarchy between religious and 
political authorities in the world (III.5,6,11); and 3), the dis-
tinct, individualized powers of Pope and Emperor must be rec-
ognized and protected for their proper function. Dante partic-
ularly emphasizes dismantling ideas of Papal supremacy over 
the Emperor; that being said, he does not neglect scenarios of 
imperial supremacy over the Church or improper unifications 
of the two authorities.14  However, Dante scholar Claire E. 
Honess holds that Monarchia is also “a utopian meditation on 
what might have been, and a reflection on what – between 
1310 and 1313 – had gone so badly wrong.”15 Read like this, 
                                               
13 Craig Kallendorf. “Virgil, Dante, and Empire in Italian Thought, 
1300-1500,” Vergilius 34 (1988): 49, http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/41592351. 
14 Honess, “Divided City,” 130.  
15 Claire E. Honess. “Divided City, Slavish Italy, Universal Em-
pire.” In Vertical Readings in Dante’s Comedy: Vol. 1. Ed. George 
Corbett and Heather Webb. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers 
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Monarchia III is not just a philosophical proof for distinguish-
ing between religious and political authority but a systematic 
critique of the misconceptions corrupting political and reli-
gious authorities in medieval Europe (and particularly the 
Holy Roman Empire). This makes it a valuable key for un-
locking the precise points which Dante intends to make in his 
analogies commentating on the relationship between Church 
and State in Commedia.  
Dante founds his structural separation of political and 
religious authorities in the argument that both exist inde-
pendently from the authority of the other. He introduces this 
concept in Monarchia III.4, “the argument from the sun and 
the moon,” where he explains that just as the moon does not 
receive all of its essence, strength, and function from the sun, 
but possesses movement and light of itself, so the empire does 
not derive its absolute existence, authority, or function from 
the Church.16 (Here one must remember that Dante did not 
have access to the principles of astrophysics that inform the 
modern understanding of the gravitational pull and light prop-
erties that propel and illuminate the moon.) Rather, ecclesias-
tical and political authorities can borrow from the “light” of 
the other “to fulfill their functions better and more potently.”17 
While it may seem as if the “sun and moon” waters down 
Dante’s “two suns” into two entities with a clear hierarchy, his 
“argument from the election and deposition of Saul by Sam-
uel” just two sections later in Monarchia (Monarchia III.6) re-
affirms the structure outlined in “two suns.” Monarchia III.6 
introduces Dante’s main premise for the independent exist-
ence of political and religious authority. Taken at face-value 
the example is straightforward: when Samuel dethroned Saul, 
it was not as a temporal religious figurehead (a vicar), but as a 
distinct envoy for God. As such, Samuel cannot be used as 
                                               
16 Alighieri, Dante. De Monarchia, trans. Aurelia Henry (Boston 
and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company; The Riverside 
Press, Sept. 1904), III.4.9; III.3.11.  




















proof for Papal supremacy because he was not a Pope or any-
thing resembling a Pope.18 But the greater philosophical sig-
nificance of the example introduces a fact absolutely essential 
to the Dantean argument for separation of Church and State 
(and one later stated explicitly in Monarchia III.13)—namely, 
that neither religious nor political authorities can transfer 
power to an office that is not their own.  
Most instances broaching the incommunicable nature 
of political and religious authorities in Commedia involve 
Dante criticizing the Church for attempting to seize or justify 
using power that it does not rightfully possess. The Donation 
of Constantine—purportedly a fourth-century document trans-
ferring Roman imperial authority from Constantine the Great 
to the Pope (proven to be a later forgery in the fifteenth cen-
tury)—is a textbook example. In his article analyzing Dantean 
imperialism, Cary J. Nederman cites the approach to the Do-
nation of Constantine in both Monarchia and Commedia as a 
key indication of Dante’s understanding of the separate ori-
gins—and thus, independent foundations—of political and re-
ligious authority. Dante invalidates the use of the Donation of 
Constantine as an authoritative proof of Papal supremacy over 
the empire because it “assumes two precepts that are impossi-
ble”: that Constantine could to surrender or transfer imperial 
authority, and that the Church could have accepted that 
power.19 Nederman cites the illegitimacy of the Donation of 
Constantine as evidence that imperial power remained “fully 
intact as . . . both territory and jurisdiction” in the seat it orig-
inally held in Rome, and later in Constantinople.20 In turn, he 
uses this non-transferability to explain that Church authority 
does not depend on the Emperor, since the only way to estab-
lish this interrelationship would be to transgress the rights of 
                                               
18 Ibid., III.6.2 
19 Cary J. Nederman, “Dante’s Imperial Road Leads to… Constan-
tinople?: The Internal Logic of the “Monarchia,” Theoria 62, 
no.143 (June 2015): 7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24720405 
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either imperial or ecclesiastical authority, and—as Dante 
says—“the usurping of a right does not establish a right.”21 
While Nederman does not define clear boundaries for the 
rights of imperial and ecclesiastical powers, Dante at least of-
fers detailed proof for the claim that temporal power is inher-
ently oppositional to the nature (and therefore right) of eccle-
siastical power in Monarchia III. 22  Ultimately, then, it is 
illogical to assume that the existence and legitimacy of one 
religious or political power relies on the other since the offices 
of Pope and Emperor have entirely distinct natures that de-
prive them of the ability to transfer authority between one an-
other.  
Despite insisting that political and religious authori-
ties are inherently different, Dante maintains that Church and 
State are structural equals because their inherent incompara-
bility makes each is supreme in its own domain. The same dis-
tinction of natures that prevents the transmission of power be-
tween religious and political authorities also prevents a direct 
comparison of the two. Dante argues that a universal standard 
of measurement can only be used to compare things of the 
same genus, and while the Pope and Emperor are in the same 
genus of being (because they are both men, and therefore pos-
sess the same substance), they have different genii of accident 
(defined, at least in part, by their relationality). Simply put, the 
Pope is Pope because of his relationship to the Church as a 
spiritual father, and the Emperor is Emperor because of his re-
lationship to the State as governor. The two powers are thus 
defined by different accidental forms, which means that the 
                                               
21 Ibid., 9 




















offices23 cannot be compared to one standard.24 Given this ar-
gument, there cannot be a structural hierarchy between Pope 
and Emperor because that requires one office to fall closer to 
a unified standard of measurement. Instead, Dante equates the 
structural significance of religious and political authorities us-
ing the universal power of St. Peter “to bind and loose” all 
things which pertain to his office—and his office alone—as 
evidence for their supremacy within their respective do-
mains.25   
At the same time, Dante establishes a clear teleologi-
cal hierarchy between political and religious authorities that 
ultimately supports their structural equality. The emphasis on 
achieving the spiritual fulfillment which culminates in the Be-
atific Vision throughout Commedia gives the Church a greater 
teleological significance, since it relates to spiritual pursuits 
more directly. However, Dante maintains the Aristotelian phi-
losophy that earthly fulfillment is a necessary precursor to 
eternal fulfillment—and thus the state also plays a crucial role 
in salvation.26 Kallendorf writes that, to Dante, “politics is im-
portant . . . as an arena in which the Platonic hero can develop 
the civic virtues as a prelude to the contemplative pursuit of 
the summum bonum.”27 The Platonic hero may be markedly 
distinct from the Aristotelian hero, but both Platonic and Ar-
istotelian philosophies establish virtue-based systems in which 
human fulfillment depends on achieving particular civic and 
personal virtues. Aristotelian philosophy, however, bears 
                                               
23 Dante is careful to distinguish that the incomparability of the of-
fices does not preclude comparison of the men, insofar as they are 
men and not Pope or Emperor (Mon III.15). This allows for a moral 
comparison of both figures while still respecting their individual 
offices.  
24 Ibid., III.12.1-5 
25 Ibid., III.8.4-5 
26 Honess, “Divided City,” 122-23 
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greater similarity to the Dantean understanding that the fulfill-
ment of the end of the state develops the virtues that are con-
ducive to eternal fulfillment. The ends of ecclesiastical and po-
litical society are comparable in this sense, though not in 
structure, because of the type of relationality the comparison 
considers. Rather than comparing their temporal powers rela-
tive to one another, the teleological ranking of church and state 
powers compares their relationship to salvation, and so is a 
comparison by the same accident. In the language of the “two 
suns,” they are two lanes on the same road. Therefore, Dante 
can and does distinguish between the structural and teleologi-
cal relationships of ecclesiastical and political authorities to 
establish a teleological hierarchy even despite their structural 
equality and incomparability. In doing so, he builds a frame-
work for understanding how the independent existences and 
structural differentiation of religious and political authorities 
relate to their teleological fulfillment.  
Dante adapts Aristotelian philosophies about the telos 
of the state and rejects the Augustinian condemnation of 
earthly government to demonstrate the teleological signifi-
cance of separating religious and political offices. While St. 
Augustine maintained that earthly politics held no salvific 
merit other than to reduce earthly chaos, Aristotle believed that 
the state is an essential leg in the journey to human fulfill-
ment.28 Dante’s notion of the teleological relationship between 
the structure, function, and end of state derives from Aristote-
lian thought. In his Politics, Aristotle explains that a good state 
is directed toward the ultimate human good—or happiness—
which he believes to be found in the acquisition of the virtues 
that are necessary to fulfill human nature.29 Given his obser-
vation that “man is, by nature, a political animal,” and can only 
find happiness in society, he contends that human fulfillment 
                                               
28 Honess, “Divided City,” 122-23 
29Aristotle. Politics, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random 




















can only be achieved through participation in the state.30 Aris-
totle thus assigns a massive teleological significance to the 
state, since a society that fails to promote the pursuit of happi-
ness ultimately cripples the ability of its citizens to ever 
achieve fulfillment. Since Aristotle means the fulfillment of 
human nature when he says happiness, and the Christian con-
cept of human fulfillment is the perfection of his nature 
through the return to a state of perfect communion with God, 
Dante’s ideal Christian-Aristotelian state culminates in the ful-
fillment of the Beatific vision.31  
Here it is relevant to note that Aristotle and Dante do 
not write of the same virtues: superficially, it seems that Aris-
totle emphasizes political virtues—virtues that moderate hu-
man temperaments and relationships—instead of the theolog-
ical and cardinal virtues upon which Dante focuses. Neither 
approach displaces the other, however; instead, Dante extends 
the Aristotelian concept of civic virtue. Dante argues that 
achieving earthly happiness through civic virtue facilitates the 
higher-level contemplation that allows the pursuit of eternal 
happiness.32 This notion is not foreign to Christian thought; in 
fact, most Christian eschatologies include some reference of 
political organization in the resurrected world. Consider, for 
example, the language of the “New Jerusalem” in Revelation 
21:22 (NRSV).33 That Dante thus expands and adapts Aristo-
telian political teleology to relate the end of the state (earthly 
happiness) to the end of the Church (eternal happiness) has a 
tangible historical basis.  
The prominence of Aristotelian political teleology in 
Dante’s writing helps illuminate his emphasis on separating 
religious and political authorities in the world. In particular, 
                                               
30 Ibid., III.6.19-29 
31 Ibid., VII.1.22-24; 40-45. 
32 Kallendorf, “Virgil,” 68 
33 Fink, David. “Freedom and Politics” (class lecture, Christian 
Classics: Dante’s Commedia. Furman University, Greenville, SC. 
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the salvific significance that Dante assigns the state means that 
over-subjecting political to ecclesiastical authorities would 
cripple human fulfillment—a stance which is not unexpected 
given the historical context and his personal experiences with 
the Papacy. Despite its role in salvation, Dante still discusses 
the state in primarily secular terms by arguing that the duty of 
the Emperor is to guide humans to earthly happiness “by 
means of philosophical instruction”—in other words, to de-
velop the rationality and intellect that humanity needs to con-
template higher things. The influence of the emperor is not 
limited to the temporal sphere, however; rather, the emperor 
fulfills his role in the economy of eternal salvation by cultivat-
ing the natural virtues and temporal goods that facilitate spir-
itual completion. This purpose is markedly different from that 
of religious authorities, who must “lead the human race to life 
eternal by means of revelation.”34 Religious authorities skip 
over the temporal realm and jump straight to the “big picture” 
issue of eternity. As Marco insinuates in the analogy of the two 
suns with the statement “the one snuffed out the other,” the 
combination of political and religious authorities undermines 
the pursuit of earthly happiness (and therein the achievement 
of eternal happiness) by overemphasizing either revelation or 
philosophy to the detriment of the other.35 Logically, then, po-
litical and religious authorities cannot be institutionally com-
bined, since it undermines their capacity to recognize the indi-
vidual role each plays facilitating human fulfillment. 
Given his understanding of the relationship between 
political and religious powers and the pursuit of earthly and 
eternal virtue, then, it is entirely logical when, in Purgatorio 
XVI, Dante attributes the marked absence of virtue in medie-
val Europe to an unnatural overlap between the Papacy and 
Emperor. The analogy of the two suns, read in context of the 
Aristotelian foundation of Dante’s politics and the incompara-
bility of religious and political authority, depicts two entities 
                                               
34 Monarchia III.16.5 




















of equal stature which possess their own sources of authority, 
significance, and impact. Likewise, the analogy of the cleft 
hooves emphasizes the need for the need for these two entities 
to be separate to create a balanced society, and its allusion to 
ritualistic purity in Leviticus insinuates that the two entities 
draw a society towards God when separated and away from 
Him when unified (since the uncleft hooves are defined as rit-
ualistically impure). Ultimately, Dante’s understanding of the 
Divine allocation of spiritual and political powers, and their 
resultant relationship, suggests that denying their individual-
ized functions, independent existences, or structural and tele-
ological differentiation undermines salvation by denying the 
Pope and Emperor the chance to fulfill their respective salvific 
roles. Since the achievement of perfect human fulfillment is 
the overarching theme and ultimate goal in Commedia and at 
the basis of Monarchia, it is only natural that he is a scathing 
critic of the combination of ecclesiastical and political powers.  
In a nation where “Papacy” (the Church) and “Empire” (in this 
case, in the form of a Democratic Republic) are mostly—if not 
completely—structurally distinct, some may wonder how 
Dante’s political theory applies to present-day America. The 
power struggle between organized religion and organized pol-
itics seems outdated—but is it? Over the last eighteen months, 
it seems that the dearth of earthly virtues and goodness far out-
weighs their presence in our country; and, just as Dante 
blamed the organizing forces of his society, so today members 
of the media and public institutions, citizens, and even politi-
cians tend to blame the government for what they perceive to 
be its failure to regulate society effectively. The Black Lives 
Matter protests of June-July 2020, for example, were under-
scored with the belief that lack of reform in the American Jus-
tice System perpetuates racism; they were a public cry for gov-
ernmental change to rectify a perceived social ill. Only months 
before, the controversial drone strike on Iranian General So-
leimani (3 January 2020) sparked an eruption of media outcry 
and partisan debate that accentuated political division between 
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demands for political reform. In the ongoing wake of the 
COVID-19 pandemic today, the public continues to petition 
the government to provide equal access to sufficient 
healthcare. Each of these examples highlights an instance in 
which the general public tends to place responsibility for so-
cial issues upon the government. The government may influ-
ence the issue but, as Dante has shown, the answer is not so 
simple as “the government is not doing its job.” In fact, his 
examination of how a dysfunctional relationship between 
Church and State affects human telos is remarkably applicable 
to present-day issues.  
In many ways, the modern American dialogue sur-
rounding the extent to which the government ought to legislate 
or be held responsible for moral issues adapts Dante’s exami-
nation of the ideal balance between a singular Church and 
State power to a multi-faith, democratic nation. To understand 
this application, it is beneficial to contextualize the meaning 
of “moral” in this argument. In his stark structural distinction 
of religious and political authorities, Dante also distinguishes 
religious and political morals.36 Broadly, political morals per-
tain to the fulfillment of the end of a state; whether something 
is politically moral in America is thus defined by the extent to 
which it contributes to or obstructs an individual’s Constitu-
tional rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Reli-
gious morals relate to the ideas, virtues, ways of life, and 
guidelines for action that align with a particular belief system; 
this is what is more commonly associated with the term ‘mo-
rality.’ Dante would say that the morality that relates to the 
                                               
36 On first glance, some might mistake this as a belief hauntingly 
similar to the Augustinian “city of man” and “city of God” sce-
nario, where each is mutually exclusive. St. Augustine’s political 
theory is largely based on teleological end, however, and so 
Dante’s structural distinction does not fall into the same category. 
The teleological hierarchy of Church and State that he outlines 
means that this moral distinction works in favor of a harmonious 




















social issues for which the government is often blamed is dual: 
it is a matter of political and religious morals. The cause, he 
might suggest, is in their imbalance.   
The modern picture admittedly looks a little bit differ-
ent than Dante’s did. Where he was concerned with the over-
religionization of political power, we face increasing secular-
ization as politics bleed into the churches. Gone is the idea that 
religion is the moral compass and government the legally or-
ganizing principle of society. Morality today—when one dares 
speak of it as a set of established norms instead of an exclu-
sively subjective lifestyle—is more determined by who you 
voted for and whether your blood runs red or blue than by your 
core beliefs and individual temperaments and actions. In other 
words, it increasingly undermines religious morality by over-
emphasizing political “morality” (which has also been per-
verted by partisanship; but that is a paper for another time). 
Politics, political morality, and religious morality are becom-
ing so tightly interwound in the attempt to legislate social 
questions into nonissues by creating laws that theoretically 
rectify big-questions issues that we are beginning to lose track 
of where one ends and the other begins. This is not to say that 
politics should not be religiously moral, or that non-political 
morals cannot be extended to politics. Politics should adhere 
to certain principles from religious (and other domains of) mo-
rality, and so in that sense there is room for healthy overlap 
between the two. When politics become a means of legislating 
religious morals instead of political morals, however, or reli-
gious morals a means of manipulating political powers, con-
flict arises as the two “suns” battle for a position in which one 
can “snuff out” the other.  
As Dante demonstrates in his examination of the rela-
tionship between the fourteenth century Papacy and Empire, 
striking a healthy balance between politics, religion, and the 
enforcement of their respective morals is much more akin to 
walking a tightrope than a well-paved road. Government, 
Dante says, regulates earthly society, but the morals inherent 
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church, too.37 The duty of the church is to cultivate the proper 
virtues and dispositions that are necessary to rectify social is-
sues, through emphasis on spiritual and interior life. Large-
scale social issues cannot be fixed in a generalized govern-
ment/political action or legislation alone; they have to be ad-
dressed in the everyday lives of individuals, who one-by-one 
make conscious decisions to live according the principles 
which are hoped to be implemented. While it is the duty of the 
government to regulate society broadly so as to best facilitate 
the development of these attitudes, it is not its duty to actually 
cultivate these habits of life and mind. Government is not a 
governor of the individual, but a coordinator of said individu-
als. The government can legislate morals, but only to an ex-
tent, and with a largely disciplinarian approach. It is much 
more effective if morals are taught, adopted, and incorporated 
into the daily interior lives of the individuals whom the gov-
ernment governs. Given the individualized nature of this pro-
cess, and the fact the government is not designed to cater to 
the individual, this is not a job for politics.  Rather, the church 
should develop/nurture the moral disposition of a person such 
that they promote healthy ideals in society. The church is thus 
responsible for cultivating good morals and virtues which can 
then be translated into government (all of this in a representa-
tive system in which the government directly or semi-directly 
represents the will and disposition of its citizens). In this way, 
religious morals are not trampled beneath politics, but inform 
political action such that it is more effective; the “two suns” 
work together.  
Nearly seven hundred years after Dante wrote Com-
media, we, too, are left striving to stumble across the tightrope 
that is a healthy balance between political and religious mo-
rality and authority. Just as a tightrope sways and gives under 
                                               
37 Here forward, church refers more to organized religion as a cate-
gory than one particular denominational iteration of a specific reli-
gion to account for the religious pluralism of modern America. 




















weight and movement, so the ideal balance of church and state 
ebbs and flows with the evolution of a political society. Our 
ideal arrangement of political and religious authority may not 
perfectly mirror that of Dante’s time, but that does not dis-
count the significance of striking a balance that does work. 
Trying to address the prominent social issues of our time with-
out considering the proper alignment of their religiously and 
politically moral components is like trying to walk that tight-
rope with vertigo: perhaps not impossible, but certainly more 
difficult. Address the cause of vertigo (an improper balance of 
political and religious morality in the political approach to so-
cial issues) and begin treating it (through gradual changes in 
the approach to and implementation of political and religious 
morals), and walking the tightrope suddenly becomes less ten-
uous. Dante is not one to sugarcoat his warnings, and while his 
wording may be elegant, his message to readers across the 
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Any attempt to locate the whereabouts of it ends up 
like a dive into the foggy heart of an industrial city. Trying to 
grasp it by gazing at it? Futile attempt as it is, it does reward 
you with a picture: a picture of you, of what’s surrounding 
you, of what is not what you have in mind, that is the thing 
you are gazing at. It does not resist the effort of integration 
through comprehension, for how could one configure the be-
ing of an absence? Yet by its absence it gives you a distinct 
presence. The duplication of the surroundings is like a second 
degree simulation. You can navigate yourself simply by look-
ing at the mirror image of yourself. No, I am not talking about 
postmodernism yet, I am talking about a commercial plaza/of-
fice building in my hometown. It’s clad in a mirror whose sole 
purpose is to resist penetration, and to return the projectile 
gazes back to their owners. On one part of the building its re-
flective armor is shaped like waves, so as to achieve the cun-
ning artistry of seduction—it shows itself by a disruption on 
its surface, to make you feel the presence of something on a 
completely flat surface, yet in such discovery of an artificial 
presence, the surface of absence that gave birth to it became 
obsolete to the one who beholds. 
The resistance of penetration becomes contradictory 
when its porousness is revealed— the building has gates all 
around it. Entering it is waving-goodbye to the world outside, 
as I can still remember the moment I enter when it first opened 
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ever been to—a biome of its own making—yet not so different 
from a hundred shopping plazas I’ve been to, as a stepping into 
a structure like this is the reincarnation into a mechanical, fully 
automated womb of glass dome. The escalator that goes from 
the first floor directly to the fifth floor never stopped, and I can 
still feel myself becoming dizzy when, being the only fool on 
that escalator, I turned around and looked at the four floors 
beneath me. I became dizzy, and myself on the first floor 
waved at me, and I waved back from the fifth floor, with no 
way of going down since the escalator only goes up. I was then 
pushed along by the crowd that patrols around the floor like 
sentinel bots whose sole purpose is to interact with products 
neatly arranged throughout the floor. I felt like a platter of su-
shi on a conveyor belt, where the products in my eyes became 
the consumer and I became a product. This is the topic of this 
paper, on malls, or to be more exact, on the postmodernity in 
which a shopping mall becomes an epitome of its character. I 
seek to identify some phenomenal similarities between the 
postmodern philosophical trend, postmodern space, and 
trauma theory. I acknowledge my proposed method of inquiry 
could make me a target of accusation, for how could I expect 
anything plausible coming from my analysis without announc-
ing with confidence of my expertise and theoretical exertion, 
like an analyst to a patient, that these are your symptoms and 
here is your pill? Therefore let us reach a consensus before we 
proceed, that the goal of this paper is to send out an invitation, 
an invitation to think not hierarchically but horizontally, not 
foundationally but contextually, about the connection between 
trauma not as a disease inscribed in MDS-5 but as a discourse 
among common populace and what we now (often vulgarly 
and abusively) refer to as “postmodern.” 
A dissection of the paper into three parts becomes 
helpful when making sense of the issue at hand: a brief account 
of the affinities between trauma as a theoretical discourse and 
the philosophical shift from traditional metaphysics-focused 
tradition to the turn-of-the-language inspired trend. Following 




















François Lyotard as “metanarrative.” Then a study of post-
modern space will join the conclusions of the two sections be-
fore, at which the purpose of it will be to highlight how modern 
space is traumatic in itself, whereas postmodern space exhib-
its characteristics of post-traumatic experiences. All three 
sections serve well for the final dive into a comparative study 
of two novels Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and The 
Crying of Lot 49, where we shall see how connections between 
the postmodern and trauma manifest themselves. The stylistic 
choice of this paper will also be altered from the traditional 
academic style, for to talk about trauma one must not illustrate 
with mere arguments and quotations, but perform and emulate 
the structure of trauma itself. The rejection of the academic 
style and the adoption of the literary and the poetic is essen-
tially the rejection of the metaphysical over the hermeneutics. 
The subversion of modern metaphysics-centered phi-
losophy is significant in the turn to language, in Saussure the 
signified and signifier became separate, allowing one to remi-
niscence the claim of nominalism—the pipe no longer sub-
stantiates what it refers to, that there is a gap between the sign, 
the symbolic, and the word “pipe” and the referent, the real, 
and the longish thing we use to smoke. It is a tradition that is 
post-Kantian in that the signifier and the signified resembles 
the relation between the noumena and the object-in-itself. This 
gap of meaning opens two possible routes to explore: the re-
sistance of knowing and the collapse of a modernist narratorial 
order. 
The results of the tendency in recent philosophical 
trend is especially notorious in the mutation of traditional phil-
osophical work into the writing of theories, which is a process 
this paper participates to a certain extent. What incurs its no-
toriety and its reputation is precisely the coherence with the 
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of any kind.”1 In France the mutation into post-structuralism 
starts with seekers of escape from the all encompassing Hege-
lianism, or, if we are to be bold enough to imply, an escape 
from what appears fatherly, a resistance of the Oedipus com-
plex. The infamous claim of Derrida “there is nothing outside 
of text” is almost trite due to its overuse. In a system of sign, 
“words depend on other words for their meaning, rather than 
on reference to some extra-linguistic reality.”2 Thus, even the 
concept of transcendence is only sensible when it is configured 
not as referring to anything outside the system of the sign but 
an immanent transcendence. The criticism of postmodern de-
construction—that it rejects the existence of truth which leads 
it to be self-defeating—is a misread, whereas the denial of 
transcendence as such is not a rejection of it—not that there is 
no transcendence, but what the transcendence is as such. And 
this resistance dances vis-a-vis to the legacy of enlightenment, 
the desire to know and to edify, and plays as an orchestra of 
heterogeneity contra to the solo instrument of “the urge to 
know … to convert otherness and difference into sameness,” 
a coherent narrative that excludes anything heterogeneous.3 
Henceforth this movement resists the analyst, the big-
ger end of an extending branch, and the first hundred sturdy 
bricks you lay at the base when build a house, what comes is 
“the ‘arborescent’ model of thought,” the stroll of a schizo, a 
self-referential, contextual system that need no exteriority to 
sustain the narratorial sensibility. It resists to be made sense 
solely through the act of seeing and laying claims on reason, 
since “vini, vidi, vici” , according to this frame of interpreta-
tion, is preceded by "vini, vidi, intellexi.” The act of seeing 
accompanied by the act of understanding, of witnessing being 
translated through a system of predetermined sign (signs that 
                                               
1 Paul Sheehan, “Postmodernism and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp.21. 
2 ibid, 23. 




















bear the marks of substantiation) into the qualification of mas-
tering, and of a history grasped through a consciousness that 
interprets by a frame of narrative, as if history is like a grape 
that can only grow if it climbs the rack of meaning, is the order 
being subverted and criticized in the postmodern. Similarly, 
the history of trauma seems to carry the same dynamic as the 
tug-o-war of interpretation—the inexact origin of trauma and 
the attempt of locating it and to territorialize  it through either 
psychoanalysis or modern psychological experiment resem-
bles the dynamics between a system of sign as nothing but a 
constellation of sign and the attempt to give them arbitrary 
meanings, to make sense of what inherently no sense through 
a creative process of naming—this longish thing is what we 
call pipe, these symptoms you experienced results from the 
physical shock you received in your spine when train crashed. 
The inability for trauma patients to provide a sensible 
account of where their symptoms originate from resembles a 
history out of touch with the possible methods of account. The 
basic philosophical inquiry “where am I from” finally be-
comes a strikingly demanding question when the event that 
causes trauma passes. The person who survived the train crash 
is left with a history that is not incorporated and a memory that 
is not entirely hers but nonetheless haunts her. In Cathy 
Caruth’s reading of the film Hiroshima mon amour, there is a 
clear resistance to the attempt of making sense of by seeing. 
When the woman mentions seeing the event of Hiroshima in a 
museum, the man denies the aboutness of her experience, 
which “suggests that the act of seeing, in the very establishing 
of a bodily referent, erases, like an empty grammar, the reality 
of an event.”4 The trauma erases itself when registered as his-
tory: “that happened to me a few decades ago/ I remember this 
city has been through from reading my history textbook.” 
What is known is solely the representation, whereas the origin 
of the simulated representation is no more, yet at the same time 
                                               
4 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History 
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exists as what cannot be grasped, something that haunts and 
cannot be articulated, since every articulation disperses the es-
sence of that trauma into the representational order of history. 
This is why for Caruth, there is “the necessary betrayal of the 
particular past in the understanding of a history,” since it is not 
the trauma itself being commemorated, but it can only be com-
memorated as history through a system of sign that does not 
belong to one's own.5 
To elucidate, a real historical example will serve the 
purpose well. On July 12, 2020, another earthquake happened 
in my hometown. The magnitude is 5.1, the circle of impact is 
about 10 kilometers. I try to collect information, including my 
mother’s account, who was at the time at the site of the event. 
I cannot feel anything, much like the time when I toured the 
earthquake museum in my city that was dedicated to preserve 
the memory of the earthquake in 1967, with the magnitude of 
7.8, and 244,000 casualties. I watched the documentaries, 
movies, and remains of that devastation. I comprehend, but I 
do not feel anything, except a ripple of empathy. Empathy for 
who? For the deceased? What is that which I witnessed? Is it 
the original trauma? A simulation of it? Or is it simply another 
story now I have to read? Was the museum tour any different 
from Middlemarch? Is it more real simply because there are 
collapsed pillars present? What if I donate some of my money 
for a Middlemarch museum? My experience of the museum 
tour resembles the experience of the woman in the film, which 
makes the contrast between an order of knowing and the lost 
origin stark. The moment of the earthquake is no more, and 
the moment of Hiroshima is no more. The genesis is only now 
preserved as a text that is open for seeing, but it is a represen-
tation of the genesis now that does not exist, a different type 
of real, a hyperreal of the genesis. The true moment of the 
trauma is not to be integrated into the consciousness, much 
like the earthquake sites preserved throughout the city, unable 
                                               




















to be made sense of by the generation born after the earth-
quake, nor can they be torn down and forgotten. The authen-
ticity of traumatic commemoration is an event that is forever 
lost due to the volatile essence of the event in relation to the 
attempt to articulate and to make sense of.  However this au-
thenticity is at the same time perpetually present because of its 
inability to be articulated and updated is forever present as 
something that cannot be articulated, catheterized, or compro-
mised—an absence. This is why Caruth claims that “a history 
can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occur-
rence.”6 
The resistance of seeing and knowing implies the need 
of interpretation. Hermeneutics comes after the death of God 
and resultant disruption of clarity of meaning. Perhaps the 
death of God is not exact here. It is better to say the death of 
God as such. To claim God is such and such can no longer be 
registered as a metaphysical claim of God’s definitive 
aboutness, but the essence of such claim recedes to a symbol, 
an exclamation—doesn’t mean it is empty, but its aboutness 
changes from a definitive claim about the ontology of what we 
refer to as God to a claim that expresses one’s faith, of one’s 
belief in the system of possible references one find possible to 
choose from. It is not that I am “reducing” the claim “God is 
dead'' to a direct denial of the claim “God exists.” It is more 
like “the God that exists is not what denies other claims about 
the ontology of God once and for all, but to say that God is 
dead is, similarly, not to deny the claims about the ontology of 
God configured as existence.” God as absolute has died, and 
we now have to interpret and evaluate ourselves, just as the 
traceable origin of the site of trauma which repeats itself be-
comes invisible. To hand the interpretation back to the con-
sciousness self is what it does, so there is no excuse like “it is 
true because it is outside of the system of interpretation and 
signs as the absolute, as the objective,” but “it is true within 
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the system of signs, because of relevant inferences within the 
system that ultimately I have to interpret and decide.” 
In short, it signals the collapse of “metanarratives,” 
where, according to Lyotard, legitimacy of modernity turns 
into knowledge that “refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.”7 At-
tempts of assigning any happenings to a narratorial order re-
sembles the attempt of making sense of trauma through artic-
ulation, either through making a witness possible, or by 
submitting oneself to a psychoanalysis or psychiatrist. How-
ever, the state of traumatic experience where no witness is pos-
sible resembles this refusal to be categorized and archived by 
language of others. To have one’s defensive shield breached 
beyond one’s ability to integrate it, to make sense of it, and to 
make past a paving stone of the present, is to lose one’s his-
tory, severed from the present. The barrier that is “a barrier of 
sensation and knowledge that protects the organism by placing 
stimulation within an ordered experience of time” lost its 
power to order and to organize stimulations in traumatic expe-
rience.8 The triumphing optimism of modernism that is con-
stantly in a fight to “break with tradition and to begin a new 
way of living and thinking” turned into “a manner of forget-
ting or repressing the past … of repeating it, [not] overcoming 
it.”9 The concrete “this is” and “thou shalt” turned into a pro-
cess of recurring hermeneutics. Differentiating in styles of nar-
rative from “working on time” in modernism to “working in 
time” of the postmodern, narratives became less of an event 
                                               
7 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Postmodern Condition,” in Literary Theory: 
an Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Rya (Malden, Massachusetts: 
Wiley Blackwell, 2017), pp. 510. 
8 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 63. 
9 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Defining the Postmodern,” in The Norton An-
thology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York, New 




















but more of a position.10 Where modernist interpretation at-
tempts to master the complexity of a narrative, postmodernism 
sees the complexity and the proliferation of text as “a promise 
or horizon to which art must try to live up.”11 
Overall, the collapse of witness in traumatized indi-
viduals who can no longer be the witness of their own trau-
matic event means a repetition due to inability to integrate, 
provided the witnessing from outside is not sufficient or does 
not measure up to the authenticity. The loss of witness is con-
tributed both by “the lack of responsiveness of bystanders … 
[and] the very circumstance of being inside the event.”12 In the 
meantime the postmodern condition in the collapse of tradi-
tional narratorial order implicates the need for references of an 
immanent order, a “self-knowing, self-referential system of 
discourse.”13 The parallel here is one between the death of a 
witness and the death of the author, between an inability to 
articulate, an origin lost, and the erasure of the importance of 
the traditional authority that contains the meaning and the in-




An origin forever lost calls for a recurring confronta-
tion with something strange and familiar, at same time “at 
home” and “uncanny.” To be haunted by an image that is lost 
is to give up the epistemological, since knowing is not to be 
achieved here through laying claims on the real. It is a point of 
no return, but perhaps the gap between the point of initiation 
                                               
10 Steven Connor, “Postmodernism and Literature,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 63. 
11 ibid, 68-9. 
12 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.66. 
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and the post order can be made more comprehensible when it 
is epochal? 
It is said the rapidly changing production method and 
the productive relation caused “all new-formed [methods and 
relations] become antiquated before they can ossify,” that is 
the case even if what a city feeds on is the ossification itself.14 
Fossils turn into coals, and people dig them up, burn them, ge-
ological accumulation turned into capital accumulation, and 
the enchanted earth now became the fertile soil for railroads 
and factories. The city where I am from is known for its central 
role in providing the nation with coal and steel before it is 
known for the earthquake. One of the first railroads in China 
was built here, and it became one of the first cities to modern-
ize. The city commemorates its dirt and sweat well, as the 
workers in coal mines and on railroads will sweat no more now 
that they have been framed and put in museums, far away from 
the city center where the monuments of the earthquake and 
shopping malls lie. Sanitization now exists in museums that 
preserve mining equipment as well, but after all they were still 
ostracized. The German family that first came here and con-
tributed a massive share to the development of the cement in-
dustry in the city now have their mansion turned into a mu-
seum, with bars and small restaurants surrounding it selling 
German craft beer. The good middle class consumers now can 
roam around the historical landmark while remaining a good 
and safe distance from the real cement business, while drink-
ing a craft beer gazing at the representation of the heavy, the 
sweaty, and perhaps the dirty. What happened? Yet one thing 
is for certain, that no matter what happens, it is a constitu-
tional, quintessential change in the structure of representa-
tional and spectacular order. 
Modernity, if not anything else, captures the motion 
of accumulation perfectly. The surplus being used as invest-
ment for a new batch of productive capital, the growth of 
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profit, the rapidity of  transportation, the growth of skyscrap-
ers, the rising smoke of London smog of Victorian era, the 
roaring 20s, the pop art, and the overwhelming amount of sen-
sory input that exceeds one’s capacity to process are all part of 
the modern scheme, the motifs that epitomizes the modernity, 
the order of an utopian vision, the positivity that comes with 
positivism. It is this same motion of accumulation that set the 
definitive character of lyric poetry in Walter Benjamin, the 
shock that would be the central productive and creative force 
of poetry, and it would “sterilize this incident for poetic expe-
rience” when “it were incorporated directly in the registry of 
conscious memory.”15 In a sense, the shock experienced by 
lyric poets is to be the libido of poetry creation only when it is 
not integrated into consciousness, only when it is represented 
as mémoire involuntaire. The question, then, is what kind of 
literature can be created through such a process? 
The question is essentially a question of what shocked 
the poet and how the poet shocked. For the first question I 
would like to suggest these factors as exemplary samples of 
study: 1. Public transportation in cities; 2. The mass in the city, 
the moving crowd; 3. The factories, the industrial landscape 
that characterized modernity; 4. The mode of repetition, for 
example, standardization of production and reproduction of 
artworks. 
The action of parrying shocks assaulting one from all 
directions is not a privileged activity reserved specially for 
lyric poets. The case is for any city. For transportations, I got 
hit by cars twice, fell on the pavement countless times, and ran 
into someone a dozen times when riding an electric bike in my 
hometown, an upgraded version of the good old modern in-
vention that serves as a flaneur’s mount. I rode with little cau-
tion, for I know nothing will prevent me from being hit by 
something today. Either a car will run into me because it 
crossed a red light at the wrong moment or I will run into a car 
                                               








Furman Humanities Review 
 
72 
because I am trying to bypass an area of traffic jam. I have my 
headphones on all the time, not because I am trying to get my-
self in an accident, but because I can actually focus better with 
headphones on, for I will be less paranoid from all the honking 
coming from all around me. 
The crowd goes well with public conveyance like ba-
con with eggs. It is characteristic of Benjamin’s observation, 
which is that “[the] interpersonal relationships of people in big 
cities are characterized by a markedly greater emphasis on the 
use of the eyes than on that of the ears.”16 You don’t wish to 
be blind in a city, for you will run into people all the time, or 
perhaps fall into a manhole due to the poor urban planning. 
You do not listen attentively for the sound of the bus that has 
its wheels rubbing on the ground from a far distance, you look 
out for the bus that is coming for you with the impatient driver 
on his third shift. You cannot let your eyes off for one second 
if you are navigating in a jungle of concrete. You will need 
good eyes to make up for the ears obfuscated by the cars hum-
ming their engines around, by people talking, by music played 
in stores, etc. This awkward position does not end with being 
a pedestrian or a bike rider exposed outside. It is more marked 
for people who are enclosed in public transportations like 
trains and buses. Those make up a position where one has to 
“stare at one another for minutes or even hours on end without 
exchanging a word.”17 In subways, buses, especially during 
commute hours, one feels like a sardine in a can, or like a per-
son trapped under a collapsed architecture under an earth-
quake. One is not only jostled by the elbows and feet of other 
sardines, but the transportation itself is constantly jostling and 
shaking, moving at an incredibly high speed that doesn’t allow 
one to fully absorb what is happening to her experience, and 
one can only operate on an instinctual note. 
                                               





















Amongst the interwoven web of a massively complex 
transportation system filled with numerous heads, one is sub-
jected to a continuing flow of loss. To see a car pass by with 
flashing speed, to see people getting on and off on a bus, to be 
with others in a hermetically sealed place like subway or train, 
only to bid them farewell the very next second, all contribute 
to a sense of constant loss that is different from the traditional 
“travel from this village to the other on a slow cart or carriage” 
experience. The coincidence with trauma here is one of con-
stant bereavement, where the visage, the locus of establishing 
an ethical and personal relation, is always in a state of afterim-
age, because there is no capturing one’s image unless you ded-
icate yourself to a career of professional stalker. This bereave-
ment is “a farewell forever which coincides in [Baudelaire’s] 
poem with the moment of enchantment.”18 The “agitated veil” 
of crowd through which Baudelaire sees Paris is common to 
all city dwellers, which consists of imposed activities like be-
ing pushed around, or spotting a visage in a surging tide of 
crowd, only to have it lost and replaced by a new face new 
second. The experience in a modern city is therefore traumatic 
in the sense that one experiences a physical dizziness from 
transportation and a psychical dizziness, a recurring loss, 
when being placed in a crowd that is constantly moving with-
out its own telos. 
“He becomes an appendage of the machine.”19 Is it a 
passage referring to Chaplin’s movie Modern Times? Chrono-
logically speaking, no. Formally speaking? Yes. The proletar-
ian condition told by Marx has become the collective experi-
ence of the modern era. Like works when the industrial 
revolution first ignited its engine, the subjugation to a machine 
rhyme became more and more prevalent. For young and old 
alike, “technology has subjected the human sensorium to a 
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complex kind of training.”20 The mortar shells and the motor 
engines are both the contraptions of industry that collared 
around us and gave us a new sensation of time. A machine 
time. We no longer move with our volition, the clash between 
traditional craftsman model of industry hence forms a sheer 
contrast with the mode of calculation in wage labour. Lyo-
tard’s observation of technology is more than fitting: “[tech-
nologies] doesn’t respond to a demand coming from human 
needs. On the contrary, human entities (individual or social) 
seem always to be destabilized by the results of this develop-
ment.”21 The human subject, henceforth is rendered incapable 
of processing the stimuli, incapable of integrating the rapidly 
revolutionizing experience and capital models, and a perma-
nent sense of loss attributes to this sense of unintergrability. 
Repetition is a central pattern for both modernism and 
trauma. The assembly line renders the mass production possi-
ble through a series of adaptations to machine time, and tech-
nologies like photography and film allowed the affordable rep-
lication of artworks that were confined only to a specific group 
of people before. In short, what we witness in the process of 
reproduction of the artwork, according to Benjamin, is the loss 
of the aura, the immediacy and authenticity of the artwork. 
Moreover, just as in the traumatic repetition, where “the repe-
tition of the traumatic experience in the flashback can itself be 
retraumatizing,” the reproductive order of the artwork takes on 
meaning on its own.22 “The work reproduced becomes the re-
production of a work designed for reproducibility,” just as the 
repeated traumatic experience becomes trauma in itself.23 The 
modern invention and reorganization of productive relations 
                                               
20 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, 175. 
21 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Defining the Postmodern”, 1387. 
22  Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 65. 
23 Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility.” In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. 
Vincent B. Leitch (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 




















provides repetition of traumatic experiences. Such is essen-
tially the modern sensation experienced by Baudelaire: “the 
disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock.”24 Repro-
duction of films, one of the most prominent modern art form, 
marks the height of such transition from aura infused art into 
the order of pure reproduction where the first paragraph of 
Debord’s Society of Spectacle perfectly captures: “[every-
thing] that was directly lived has moved away into a represen-
tation.”25 The shattered graphics in Debord’s Mémoires can be 
read as a shocked psyche traversing in the highly modernized 
cities. However, if we stop at the reading of Debord, we stop 
at the height of modernity. Its continuation, however, is in 
Baudrillard, and a movement from trauma eliciting modernity 
to trauma-sustaining or trapped in trauma postmodern land-
scape is made possible. 
The reading of postmodern landscape will be accom-
panied by two texts, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and 
The Crying of Lot 49, with structural similarity about the pro-
tagonist traversing through a cityscape in search of a sign that 
(arbitrarily) relates to one deceased. 
What, then, are the two protagonists searching? Per-
haps what is not the relevant question here, for it is, like all 
signs, heavily laden with an unarticulated proposition, that 
there is something that they are searching that is real. And by 
real here, again, I do not mean real as the opposition of false, 
but real as the “above” of a designated “false”. Therefore, the 
question of Oskar—“if you don’t tell me anything how can I 
ever be right”—is to be rephrased into “how could [he] ever 
be wrong.”26 And Oedipa’s question “shall I project a world” 
is no longer a question as her “projection” became highly sim-
ulated that the readers are forced to participate in her alleged 
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paranoia.27 The reader has to linger from “is he/she mentally 
abnormal” to a full involvement of the narrative of a finally 
made-reasonable tale, which is perhaps the only possible 
structural equilibrium one could possibly locate and achieve—
not in the text, but in the reader herself. 
 Since the inquiry about the “realness” of their 
experience was delegitimized, the two novels share the same 
textual performance in presenting a “‘flat’ network of areas of 
inquiry,” in which “the respective frontiers of which are in 
constant flux.”28 Different from a plot of a classical bildungs-
roman novel, I would argue, no real “growth” has been pre-
sented in both novels in regard to the psyche of the protago-
nists. For Oedipa, she is physically active, moving through 
different spots and through different people in search of the 
truth of the post horn symbol she perceives to have signifi-
cance, but all her actions are predetermined. She does not 
bring changes to anyone she had a conversation with, but her 
role is not passive in the traditional sense. As for Oskar, all his 
activeness are rewarded only with a fantasy, an untied knot—
the letters he sent, the play in which he is involved with, and 
the final scene of digging up his father’s coffin. In short, their 
stories “appear to have a progressive aim, but in reality they 
have always ‘been achieved’.”29 Perhaps it is in this sense that 
their actions are simulated, in the sense that all the narratives 
about their stories weave into a coherent narrative within the 
confinement of self-referential motion without ever going be-
yond that: “the will to change is simply all-pervasive. The 
question is whether that change has a common goal (a modern 
telos) or merely exists for change itself.”30 
                                               
27 Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (New York, New York: Peren-
nial, 1986), pp.64. 
28 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Postmodern Condition,”510-11. 
29 Richard J. Lane, Jean Baudrillard (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.113. 




















This change for changes sake in the two novels coin-
cide with the fantasy of Oedipa and Oskar, not fantasy in a 
Freudian sense, where the fantasy for an object or a scenario 
unravels the unconscious desire, but fantasy as the basic con-
stituent of one’s selfhood. What the two novels did par excel-
lence to other narratives that are about the other trauma narra-
tives is that it achieves the goal of highlighting the repetition 
of trauma through a gesture that points to the broken-down of 
psychoanalytic authority. A disintegration of the organizing 
force, of the epistemological imposition from hierarchy of a 
set of cultural values is required to bring about the complete 
collapse of any outsiderness. For Oedipa, singing this trope 
with a higher pitch, we witnessed her psyche going to the 
limit—“the act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, 
depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost”—and 
topped with a return of a memoire involuntaire of her college 
years, which is a frequent intrusion that was never fully ex-
plained.31 In her frenzy she bent down her proud self-legislat-
ing force, changing from her uncompromisable resoluteness 
against the want of her subjugation to the authority, the lack 
articulated by Dr. Hilarius at the beginning of the novel, to a 
clear expression of a desire: “she wanted it all to be fantasy … 
She wanted Hilarius to tell her she was some kind of a nut and 
needed a rest.”32 A defeated schizo, in search of a legislative 
force, went for a psychiatrist. This is where, normally in a bild-
ungsroman novel, our heroine receives her transition towards 
the other end of equilibrium, where she becomes a socially re-
sponsible woman capable of making the right decision. How-
ever, what we witnessed instead is a breakdown of the psychi-
atrist himself: Dr.Hilarius has gone mad due to paranoia. And 
a curious turning point is when Dr.Hilarius confessed his past 
and his subscribing to Freudian theory has a remedial mo-
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tive—because Freud is a Jew. It is reasonable to give the hy-
pothesis that Dr.Hilarius is experiencing something similar to 
survivors guilt, but what is more amusing is that here it is Oe-
dipa who takes up the role of legislating and becomes the lis-
tener behind the leathered couch. She even advised Hilarius to 
“[face] up to your social responsibilities [and accept] the real-
ity principle.”33 Yet this is not a simple reversal of the role, not 
a simple reversal of the master-slave dialectics, but an attempt 
to break the limit appears when Oedipa confessed to Dr.Hilar-
ius that she seeks the expertise of Dr.Hilarius as a Freudian to 
dispel her search, what has constituted her character and mean-
ing so far, as a mere fantasy. The reply she got from Hilarius 
is to cherish her fantasies, for, he questioned “[what] else do 
any of you have” and proceeds to dismiss the psychoanalytic 
scheme that which constitutes his identity as a healer and Oe-
dipa’s identity as a patient: “don’t let the Freudians coax it 
away or the pharmacists poison it out of you … when you lose 
it you go over by that much to the others. You begin to cease 
to be.”34 A former fascist, Dr.Hilarius probably precedes the 
first English translation of Anti-Oedipus by 11 years. He and 
Oedipa thus sees the articulation of psychoanalysis that “if de-
sire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity 
depends upon an ‘essence of lack’ that produces the fantasized 
object” and denied its legitimacy.35 For them, fantasy is not a 
representation of the lack of the real, but what one ought to 
cherish, as it forms a flat surface, a contextually coherent sys-
tem on one’s own account without any referential force to-
wards outside—self sufficient.  
The same goes for Oskar, when he resists the scheme 
and questions the rule of the psychiatrist who tries to find 
proof to prove him a PTSD victim. But what’s more important 
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is the role of fantasy in the narrative of Oskar. It seems where 
the ego of Oskar really resides is in his so-called fantasies. 
First, his searching of the lock and the connection making and 
clue searching is essentially a search for meaning in a mean-
ingless landscape. Second, the novel essentially ends with a 
fantasy where Oskar imagines his father will be safe. What is 
genius about it is that it invites the readers to participate in 
Oskar's fantasy, not as an authority that judges whether he is 
in fantasy or not, but as part of Oskar, or as Oskar. The re-
versed flipping image of the person falling off the twin tower 
ensures the endless repetition of it since by going backwards 
one needs to go forwards first—especially for equipment like 
cassettes. Oskar refuses to go through a mirror stage and iden-
tifies with what he sees. In his book that records things that 
happened to me images of keys, Steven Hawking, turtles, ge-
ometric shapes, etc are present. How did this happen to him? 
Perhaps it is only sensible to Oskar. Thirdly, the image in Os-
kar’s book of Hamlet holding the skull of Yorick is intriguing 
because one may guess that Oskar is identifying with the skull, 
but who could say for sure? In his school play, Oskar plays the 
role of Yorick, the skull of a jester where Hamlet gazes and 
interacts with as a passive object. Oskar’s part is no part at all, 
he’s been erased from the play. His absence is simulated by 
the all black costume and his papier-mâché skull, in order to 
“give the illusion that you don’t have a body.”36 In fact, the 
illusion given is not that Oskar doesn’t have a body, but simply 
that there is no Oskar. The sweet coax of the teacher given, 
that Oskar may steal the show if he plays anyone else, is shat-
tered in the fantasy. In Oskar’s fantasy on stage, he becomes 
no longer the passive skull who is being gazed at and is being 
known by the active Hamlet and Horatio, but it takes on a force 
of itself. No longer being subjugated and legislated by the gaze 
of Hamlet, Oskar announces Hamlet’s fate by diagnosing him 
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which is in fact the disease 
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that has been tormenting Steven Hawking, whom Oskar ad-
mired. If this scene was a simple reversal of  the role of the 
subjugated dead skull and the living, active, neurotic, and Oe-
dipal Hamlet, it would be less charming to read this scene over 
and over again. What we witness is not a simple reversal in 
Oskar’s reverie, nor simply a fantasy about revenging the 
bully,  but a making sense, an identification with his fantasy, 
with his flat surface, which means an identification with his 
repetition of trauma. When he smashed the skull which ob-
scures him and denies his existence against the head of Jimmy, 
the skull became the head of everyone he knows, the dead be-
came everyone, implying the recognition of the ubiquitous 
fear, of the feeling that “the hostage [,which is the victim] is 
unnameable, anonymous, a kind of ghost who temporarily 
haunts the imagination.”37 Is Oskar invoking universal annihi-
lation? Is he repeating his trauma? We cannot conclude. But 
what we can conclude is that by announcing “DAD doesn’t 
make sense. MOM doesn’t make sense. THE AUDIENCE 
doesn’t make sense,” and that the only thing that makes sense 
in the fantasy of Oskar is “[his] smashing JIMMY SNYDER’s 
face,” and that in this young boy’s fantasy he made sense, for 
“THE AUDIENCE is applauding, all of them, because [he is] 
making so much sense.”38 Like Oedipa, the refusal to cope 
through the imposition of a narrative allows Oskar to not iden-
tify with fantasy, because calling something fantasy doesn’t 
make sense when the object designated as the locus of fantasy 
is denied. And as the reality fades, Oedipa and Oskar are able 
to repeat their trauma endlessly without confronting an over-
riding narrative of “accepting reality.” It is a world-shaping 
that makes one’s world into a Klein bottle, where all the dif-
ference between outsiderness and insideness vanishes, and one 
is left with an endless repetition of an immanent nature. Such 
is a trauma narrative without trauma. 
                                               
37ibid, 103. 























Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations (London: Cape, 1970 
 
___“The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Repro-
ducibility.” In The Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018. 
 
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, 
and History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2016. 
 
_____Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995. 
 
Connor, Steven. “Postmodernism and Literature,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Ste-
ven Connor. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
 
Debord, Guy. The Society of Spectacle. Detroit: Black & 
Red, 2018. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia (New York, New York: Penguin 
Books, 2009), 
 
Foer, Jonathan Safran. Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close 
London: Penguin Books, 2018. 
 
Lane, Richard J. Jean Baudrillard. London: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. “The Postmodern Condition.” in Lit-
erary Theory: an Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and 












___“Defining the Postmodern,” in The Norton Anthology of 
Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2018. 
 
Marx, Karl. The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker. 
New York: Norton, 1978. 
 
Pynchon, Thomas. The Crying of Lot 49. New York: Peren-
nial, 1986. 
 
Sheehan, Paul. “Postmodernism and Philosophy,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism. ed. Ste-
ven Connor. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
 
 
 
